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Ismet Sahin, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2006
 
As the need to support high speed data exchange in modern communication networks 
grows rapidly, effective and fair sharing of the network resources becomes very important.  
Today’s communication networks typically involve a large number of users that share the same 
network resources but may have different, and often competing, objectives.  Advanced network 
protocols that are implemented to optimize the performance of such networks typically assume 
that the users are passive and are willing to accept compromising their own performance for the 
sake of optimizing the performance of the overall network.  However, considering the trend 
towards more decentralization in the future, it is natural to assume that the users in a large 
network may take a more active approach and become more interested in optimizing their own 
individual performances without giving much consideration to the overall performance of  the 
network.  A similar situation occurs when the users are members of teams that are sharing the 
network resources. A user may find itself cooperating with other members of its team which 
itself is competing with the other teams in the network.  Game theory appears to provide the 
necessary framework and mathematical tools for formulating and analyzing the strategic 
interactions among users, or teams of users, of such networks. In this thesis, we investigate 
networks in which users, or teams of users, either compete or cooperate for the same network 
resources.  We considered two important network topologies and used many examples to 
illustrate the various solution concepts that we have investigated..  First we consider two-node 
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parallel link networks with non-cooperative users trying to optimally distribute their flows 
among the links.  For these networks, we established a condition which guarantees the existence 
and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium for the link flows.  We derived an analytical expression for 
the Nash equilibrium and investigated its properties in terms of the network parameters and the 
users preferences.  We showed that in a competitive environment users can achieve larger flow 
rates by properly emphasizing the corresponding term in their utility functions, but that this can 
only be done at the expense of an increase in the expected delay.  Next, we considered a general 
network structure with multiple links, multiple nodes, and multiple competing users.  We proved 
the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium.  We also investigated many of its intuitive 
properties.  We also extended the model to a network where multiple teams of users compete 
with each other while cooperating within the teams to optimize a team level performance.  For 
this model, we studied the Noninferior Nash solution and compared its results with the standard 
Nash equilibrium solution.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is concerned with the optimization of multi-node multi-user communication 
networks by using concepts from game theory.  This approach allows us to study cooperative and 
non-cooperative interactions among the users in the networks.  The classical approach requires 
users to optimize the overall performance of the network [1,2].  However, a user in a large 
network such as the Internet may choose to optimize its own performance rather than the overall 
network performance [3].  Game theory becomes an important tool to model and analyze these 
types of network [4-6].  Problems in optimal routing, flow control, pricing policy, and bandwidth 
allocation have all been recently formulated and solved using cooperative and non-cooperative 
solution concepts from game theory.   
Efficient use of network resources by a central control system can become difficult for the 
networks with large number of users.  Therefore, decentralized control strategies have gained 
considerable importance as they remove the complexity of a central control architecture.  Since 
users in a non-cooperative network make their own flow and routing control decisions, the 
iterative algorithms allowing these users to evaluate their optimal strategies can constitute the 
core of decentralized flow and routing control systems for next generation networks.  These 
algorithms may conceivably be implemented in the Internet by using the capability of IPv4 and 
IPv6 (Internet Protocol version 4 and 6 respectively) which provide network users to route their 
flow on a specific path [1,2]. 
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Competitive users decide on their flow rate and/or routing based on their utility functions 
which translate their needs and desires.  Utility functions that have been used in most models 
typically represent a combination of two objectives: (1) maximizing the flow rate and (2) 
minimizing the congestion delay experienced by the user’s data. There are numerous ways of 
combining these two objectives into a single optimization criterion for each user.  One approach 
[7-12] is to consider a utility function for each user in the form of “benefit/cost”, also known as a 
power criterion.  In this approach, the benefit term represents the total throughput and the cost 
term represents a measure of the average expected delay.  Maximizing the utility function in this 
case will achieve the desired two objectives.  Another approach  that has been considered is a 
utility function for each user in the form of “benefit – cost” [13-16].  Typically, the benefit term 
is a weighted measure of the throughput and the cost term is a weighted measure of the expected 
delay.  The weights can be viewed as representing the user’s preferences for one term over the 
other.  Maximizing this utility function essentially means increasing the throughput while 
simultaneously reducing the expected delay.  Since the users may differ in their throughput needs 
and tolerance for the expected delays, and they consequently can adjust the relative importance 
of the benefit and cost terms by selecting appropriate preference constants (i.e. weights) for each 
of these terms in their own utility function.  In this thesis, we consider both “benefit/cost” and 
“benefit - cost” types of utility functions. 
Since communication networks and game theory are focal points of this investigation, to 
facilitate the understanding of the concepts given later in this thesis, a brief review of these two 
topics is given in Chapter 1.  After giving a short introduction of the principles of how today’s 
communication networks work, we describe various solution concepts in game theory. 
 2 
In Chapter 2, we consider a simple two-node parallel link network with multiple competing 
users.  Each user decides on its total throughput and on the throughput sent on each link so as to 
maximize its own utility function which is in the ‘benefit - cost’ form.   The model also provides 
the users the flexibility of choosing different preference parameters for different links.  This 
allows them to adjust the amount of throughput sent on each link based on their previous 
satisfaction and experiences from these links.  We give a condition under which the existence 
and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed.  We also study some intuitive properties of 
the Nash equilibrium and present two examples to demonstrate these properties.  
In Chapter 3, we consider a general network environment with multiple nodes and multiple 
links.  Users of this network can enter and exit from any node in the network.  The route of each 
user is fixed; along a path in the network connecting a source node to a destination node specific 
for that user.  Since users share the same network resources, they decide on the flow rate 
competitively by maximizing a power-criterion utility function.  For this model, this utility 
function is more advantageous than the benefit-cost form of utility functions because it results in 
more analytically tractable solutions.  We prove the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium and 
study some intuitive properties of this equilibrium.  Next, we derive both synchronous and 
asynchronous numerical algorithms for the users so that they can evaluate their Nash equilibrium 
flow rates based on the information obtained from the network.  As pointed out previously, these 
numerical algorithms are very desirable because they encourage the establishment of distributive 
networks. 
In Chapter 4 to complete the analysis of multi-node multi-link networks, we also consider 
the same general network environment but with users that decide to cooperate with each other.  
The resultant solution is called Pareto dominant solution which usually gives larger level of 
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satisfaction to every user than the level of satisfaction they would receive from Nash equilibrium 
flow rates.  Next, we expand the model from a single team to multiple teams which compete with 
each other.  We assume that each team has a leader which ensures cooperation within the team 
but competition with the other teams.  In the new model, the optimization is performed at two 
level: (i) The leader of each team competes with the leaders of other teams in order to achieve 
the best utility for its team.  Each team leader tries to optimize a social utility function which is 
the scaled sum of all the utility functions of the users in its team, and (ii) At the team level, the 
team members cooperate to achieve a team level satisfaction rather than an individual level 
satisfaction.  The resultant equilibrium is called Noninferier Nash equilibrium [17, 18].  By 
means of two examples, we illustrate the Nash, Pareto, and Noninferior Nash equilibriums and 
compare their performances. 
In Chapter 5, we summarize some important concluding remarks in this thesis and we also 
present some suggestions on possible extensions of the current research. 
1.1 COMMUNICATION NETWORKS 
Processing power of the early computers was limited and few of these computers could run 
calculation-dense applications.  In the 1960’s, the U.S. Department of Defense Advanced 
Research Project Agency (ARPA)  decided to develop first data network, ARPANET, so that all 
research groups can share these highly powered computers [2].  The principle purpose was to 
design a reliable data network which can perform even though some parts of the network fail.  
This early network has evolved and eventually led to today’s Internet, the global network 
interconnecting networks around the world. 
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Communication networks can be classified into three different networks, namely circuit 
switched networks, packet switched networks, and virtual switched network based on the 
switching type..  In circuit switched networks, a circuit between a source node and a destination 
node is set up before the communication starts.  Here, “circuit” refers to all network resources 
such as switches, routers, communication links, etc. allocated for the communication between the 
source and the destination nodes.  The main characteristic of this network is that network 
resources allocated for a communication between two nodes are dedicated to this 
communication.  Therefore, these resources are not available to other users until the 
communication ends and the resources are released.  However, dedicated resources can 
guarantee a quality of service in these networks.  In packet switched networks, each source node 
splits its data into small blocks of information bits, called packets, then sends these packets to the 
destination.  Since each packet has the source and destination addresses, a packet can be treated 
as an independent entity so that multiple sources can send their data through the same network 
resources.  In the virtual switched networks, each communication session between two nodes 
starts with setting up a virtual circuit between these two nodes.  Both nodes use this virtual path 
to send and receive packets until the end of communication.  Virtual circuits support different 
level of quality services while many users still can share the same network resources. 
Communication networks can also be classified based on the location. A network 
consisting of computers in a building or in a small geographical area is called local area network 
(LAN).  A wide area network (WAN) can contain computers in a very large geographical area.  
To understand how computer networks work, first we will introduce local area network, and then 
we will discuss how an internet works.  We will try to keep the discussion as compact as possible 
by giving only the general underlying concepts and ignoring the details.  
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1.1.1 Local Area Networks (LANs) 
Early communication networks used a connection scheme in which there was at least one 
link between any two nodes as illustrated in Figure 1.1.  They are also called point-to-point 
networks or mesh networks. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. A Mesh Network 
 
 
The number of links in mesh networks grows exponentially for each additional computer.  
Therefore, the construction cost of these networks can be prohibitively high.  Another important 
shortcoming of these networks is that many links are not used most of the time.  In modern 
LANs, almost all resources in the network are shared by all computers, therefore, the cost of 
building networks reduces and these resources are used more efficiently.  Only one transmission 
at a time can take place in shared networks (in the medium) while others have to wait their turn.  
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There are many LAN technologies with their own specification about the topology of the 
network, the format of the packet, the modulation scheme, etc. Topology of the network specifies 
how to connect computers with each other.  We use the term “frame” instead of “packet” for a 
given LAN technology since each LAN technology has its own packet specification.  We will 
briefly explain how an Ethernet network, a well known LAN technology, operates. 
A typical Ethernet network using 10Base-T wiring scheme is shown in Figure 1.2. Each 
node in the network needs a network interface card, called Ethernet card1 which has a unique 
Ethernet address2 that comes within its electronic circuitry.  The Ethernet hub located at the 
center of the network is also a circuit that regulates the transmissions in the network.  It allows 
only one user to transmit at a time, thus, mainly performing a multiplexing function.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2. An Ethernet Network 
 
                                                 
1 An Ethernet card is a collection of circuits printed on a board. It is plugged into the mother board of the computer. 
2 The Ethernet address is also called the physical address of the node. 
 7 
Suppose that node A with Ethernet address a has some data to transmit to node B with 
Ethernet address b in Figure 1.2.  First, node A checks the network for any on-going 
transmission.  If there is no on-going transmission, node A, using the standard Ethernet frame 
format, puts the source and destination addresses, and its data into frames then it sends the 
frames to the hub.  After receiving the frames, the hub copies each frame to all other links so that 
all computers can get the frames.  Eventually, each computer extracts the destination Ethernet 
address from the frames it received and compares it with its own Ethernet address.  They will 
match only for node B, thus, only node B will keep the frames while other nodes do not. 
Two or more transmissions can not take place at the same time in an Ethernet since all links 
and the hub are used for only one transmission. Therefore, these Ethernets are called shared 
Ethernets.  If two or more nodes start transmission at the same time, then the hub will inform all 
nodes that a collision happened. Being aware of the collision, the source nodes wait for random 
periods of time before re-transmitting. The mechanism of how to access to the medium, 
described very shortly the above, is an implementation of CSMA/CD (carrier sensitive multiple 
access / collision detection) protocol in Ethernet. 
Due to performance concerns, there is a limit on the number of nodes that can be connected 
to the same Ethernet hub. Performance can be increased by interconnecting Ethernets with 
switches or routers. 
1.1.2 The Internet 
An internet consists of two or more networks such as Ethernets connected by routers. Each 
node in an internet has a unique network address and an Ethernet address. Unlike Ethernet 
addresses, a network address is usually based on the geographical position of the node.  Routers 
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make the decision of where to send the packet based on the network address not the Ethernet 
address.  A simple internet illustrated in Figure 1.3 has five Ethernets which are interconnected 
by four routers: R1, R2, R3, and R4.   
Suppose that node A wants to send some data to node B.  The Ethernet addresses of node A 
and B are a and b and their network addresses are A and B, respectively.  Node A sends its 
Ethernet frame [a, r1 | A, B | data] to the router it is connected to.  After receiving the frame, 
router R1 makes some modifications on the frame such as it throws away the Ethernet addresses 
and puts the information into a packet with IP (Internet Protocol) format.  Then R1 checks its 
routing table to find out which router destination address B is connected to.  In this case it is R4. 
R1 sends the IP packet [A, B | data] to R4.  R4 checks its routing table and deliver the packet to 
R3.  Finally, R3 finds out that the destination is in an Ethernet and sends the Ethernet frame [r3, 
b | A, B | data] to the Ethernet hub which copies the frame to its all output ports and eventually, 
the destination node b receives the frame. 
The global Internet interconnects the networks around the world.  Two important protocols, 
TCP (Transfer Control Protocol) and IP (Internet Protocol), usually referred together as TCP/IP, 
are used for exchanging data in the Internet.  IP specifies how to assign a unique network address 
to each computer in the Internet and how to send a packet from a source node to a destination 
node.  IP defines a universal packet format to be able to perform packet delivery in the Internet 
which contains various networks with different frame formats and technologies.  IP supports best 
effort service for delivering packets from a source to a destination node in the Internet. It doesn’t 
guarantee that the packets might be delayed, duplicated, lost, or corrupted with transmission 
errors. 
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TCP protocol has emerged to prevent these undesirable effects and provide a reliable 
transportation in the Internet.  This protocol achieves reliability by means of an acknowledgment 
mechanism which requires a destination node to notify the source node about whether it received 
the transmitted packets successfully.   This protocol also performs flow and congestion control 
based on information available to it so that network resources are used efficiently. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3. A small internet. 
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1.2 GAME THEORY 
Game theory is an important mathematical tool to analyze many problems originating from 
various disciplines.  Problems dealing with cooperative and competitive entities in engineering, 
economics, political science, and many other fields are modeled and analyzed using game 
theoretic principles. Two important solution concepts from game theory are Nash equilibrium 
and Pareto dominance which are usually used to investigate cooperative and competing entities 
respectively. 
A player, also called user in the context of communication networks, is the basic entity in 
models of game theory.  Each user has to make a decision about which action it3 should take 
from a set of available actions.  Each user optimally chooses its action among the set of all 
actions to maximize a utility function (payoff function) or to minimize a cost function.  These 
functions translate the level of satisfaction associated with each possible action.  In other works, 
these functions define a preference relation for the users.  For instance, if x and y are two 
possible choices, a rational user will take action x if the utility of choosing x is higher than the 
utility of choosing y, or if the cost of choosing x is lower than the cost of choosing y.  
Games arise in situations where there is interdependence among users. That is, in situations 
where one user’s payoff is not only a function of its choice but also a function of all other users’ 
choices. For instance, the amount of profit of a company depends on its price setting as well as 
on other companies’ price settings.  Therefore, to maximize its utility function or minimize its 
cost function, a user makes its decision by taking into account other users’ possible decisions.  
                                                 
3 A user can be thought as a software entity which makes optimizations and decisions in computer networks. So we will refer each of them as 
“it”. 
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Even though games can be classified into many different categories, we will emphasize 
only three of them. a) Based on cooperation among the users, a game can be cooperative or non-
cooperative.  In non-cooperative games, each user is only concerned about its own payoff and 
doesn’t pay attention to other’s payoffs.  On the other hand, in cooperative games, users 
collaborate to increase their individual as well their mutual (social) payoff functions.  b) Games 
can be strategic (also called static) or repeated (also called dynamic). In strategic games, users 
simultaneously and only once make decisions.  Differently, in repeated games, users interact 
more than once and play the game many times.  In these games, users’ future payoffs depend on 
their current strategic choices.  c) In nonhierarchical games, no user enforces its strategy to other 
users.  However, in hierarchical games, a user called the leader4 can impose its strategy on 
another user which is called the follower.  The solution concept for these games is called 
Stackelberg equilibrium [19].  The leader makes a choice to maximize its own utility ahead of 
the follower and then allow the follower to know its choice.  Based on the leader’s choice, the 
follower decides on its actions to maximize its own utility function.  In this thesis, we will 
concentrate mainly on non-cooperative and cooperative strategic games. 
1.2.1 Strategic Games 
A strategic game, sometimes also called one shot game, has users who make their decisions 
only once, simultaneously, and independently [5,6]. “Once” means that users interact only one 
time and they finish the game by announcing their decisions simultaneously.  Simultaneous 
decision making can be realized in many ways.  In one scheme, each user sends its decision to a 
                                                 
4 There can be more than one leader in a hierarchical game. We focus on the games with only one leader. 
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central computer (not necessarily at the same time) and then the central computer publishes all 
users’ decisions at once. 
In static games, users are aware of each others utility functions so they know the strategic 
interactions in a game.  Let  be the set of users and N be the number of users in 
the game.  A generic user i has to choose its action
(1, 2,...., )N=N
5 from its set of possible actions .  The 
outcome of the game is given by an action profile  which is a collection of 
choices made by all users.  An action profile belongs to the set A which is the Cartesian product 
of action sets of all users, i.e. 
ia iA
1 2( , ,....., )Na a a a=
i
iA A∈⊗ N .  U  that de= ser i has the utility function :iU A→ fines 
the user’s preference relations.  Notice that the utility of user i does not only depend on its action 
i ia A∈  but also depends on the choices of all users a A
R
∈ .  In summary, by using the notation 
given the above, a strategic game can be denoted by ( ) ( ), iAN , iU . 
iU d i iU a a
d by
We interchangeably use )a  an )i−  to stress the effect of all other users’ 
actions on user i’s utility.  The decisions made by all users except user i is denote
 (  ( ,
 i ia A− −∈ , 
to be pr \{ })k i∈N . Similarly
iA−  denotes the set ecise, a a a a a a− − += ( ka= , 1 2 1 1( , ,...., , ,...., )i i i N
\{ }
k
k iA A∈= ⊗ N . 
1.2.2 The Nash Equilibrium 
Nash equilibrium is one of the most commonly used solution concepts when there is no 
cooperation among the users or when it is hard to impose cooperation.  In these cases, regardless 
of what other users do, each user wants to maximize its own payoff.  Nash equilibrium is safe 
                                                 
5 The words “action” and “strategy” are used interchangeably even though they are not synonyms.  
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against greedy efforts of any user who wants to increase its payoff by deviating from it.  A user 
can only have worse payoff if it changes its Nash strategy unilaterally.  Therefore, the Nash 
strategy is an equilibrium and can be thought as a steady-state point of the game. 
Non-cooperative games naturally lead to distributed control systems in which decision 
makers are individuals.  A central authority that makes decisions for all users is not needed in 
distributed systems.  This eliminates the complex control signaling schemes which are necessary 
for a central optimization.  Therefore, the overall system design6 is much simplified resulting 
into easily expandable communication network.  Now, let us give a precise definition of the 
Nash equilibrium [5,6]. 
 
Definition 1: The action profile *a A∈  is a Nash equilibrium of the strategic game 
( ) ( ), ,i iA UN  if it satisfies the following property for each user i∈N : 
    (1) * * *( , ) ( , ) for all i i i i i i i iU a a U a a a A− −≥ ∈
It is clear from the definition that each user i∈N  will only lose if it changes its Nash 
strategy  to any other choice .  As a result, all users in the game will prefer not to change 
their Nash strategies.  First, let us give the definition of the best actions
*ia ia
7 of a user and then give 
another definition of Nash equilibrium. 
 
 Definition 2: Given other users’ actions ia A i− −∈ , the set of best actions of user i is given by 
( )i iB a− : 
  { }' '( ) : ( , ) ( , )  for all i i i i i i i i i i i iB a a A U a a U a a a A− − −= ∈ ≥ ∈   (2) 
                                                 
6 However the complexity of the cell phone might increase. 
7 Best action is also called best response or rational response. 
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Definition 3: A Nash equilibrium of the strategic game ( ) ( ), ,i iA UN is an action profile a 
with the property: 
  * *( )  for all i i ia B a i−∈ ∈N   (3) 
Based on this definition we can evaluate a Nash equilibrium by obtaining the best 
responses of all users and then search for an action profile a such that 
.  The second step corresponds to finding the solution of the problem 
with N variable and N equations, if best response functions, 
* *( )  for all i i ia B a i−∈ N∈
iB s, are singleton-valued functions.  
1.2.3 The Stackelberg Strategy 
In previous section, we considered games in which the users were able to make decisions 
independently and simultaneously.  The Nash equilibrium is the appropriate solution concept for 
these games.   But there are situations where one user has a dominant role over other users and 
affects their choices.  Also, there are cases where there is no simple way for the users to make 
their decisions simultaneously and one user can declare its choice before other users [19].  These 
cases can be modeled and analyzed as Stackelberg games.  In these games, as mentioned before, 
there are two types of users, namely, the leader8 and the follower.  The leader is the user which 
imposes its decision over the follower by declaring its decision before the follower.  The 
follower is the user whose decision is affected by the leader’s decision and it reacts to the 
leader’s decision rationally [5,6].  Let 1A  and 2A  be the action (strategy) sets of user 1 and user 2 
respectively. User 1 and user 2 would like to minimize their cost functions 
                                                 
8 Sometimes, the leader is also called the manager. 
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1 1 2( , )J a a and , respectively.  Let us give the formal definition of the Stackelberg 
equilibrium for user 2 to be the leader [19]: 
2 1 2( , )J a a
 
Definition 4: is called a Stackelberg strategy pair of the game if 2 21 2( ,
S Sa a )
1. There exists a mapping 2 1 , such that, for any fixed 2 2a A:T A A→ ∈ , 
1l a A . 1 2 2 1 1 2 1( , ) ( , ) for alJ Ta a J a a≤ ∈
S SJ Ta a J T≤2. There exists a 22 2Sa A∈  such that )a a   2 2fo . 2 22 2 2 2 2 2( , ) ( , r all a A∈
 
Let us give another definition of the Stackelberg equilibrium with user 2 as the leader. 
 
Definition 5: is a Stackelberg strategy pair with player 2 as leader if and only if 
 and  
2 2
1 2( , )
S Sa a
2 2 1
1 2( , )
S Sa a B∈
  2 2 12 1 2 2 1 2 1 2( , ) ( , ), for all ( , )
S SJ a a J a a a a B≤ ∈   (4) 
where 1B  is the best action set of user 1. 
The leader evaluates its Stackelberg strategy by obtaining the best response of the follower 
for its all actions  and then by performing a maximization based on its action and the 
follower’s best response. 
2a A∈ 2
1.2.4 Pareto Dominance and Efficiency (Optimality) 
It is well known that the Nash equilibrium is not usually efficient [20].   The inefficiency of 
a non-cooperative system can be interpreted as the cost of having a distributed control system.  
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In some cases, users can cooperate or they can be forced to cooperate to have a more efficient 
operating point so that some or all users can benefit from it.  A Pareto dominant action profile 
increases some users’ utility without hurting any users’ utility.   On the other hand, for any action 
profile  we can find an action profile  in Pareto efficient (optimal) action profile set 
 that Pareto dominates the action profile a.  That is, 
,a A∈ *a
*A ⊂ A **a A∈  is Pareto optimal if we cannot 
find any  that Pareto dominates .   Pareto dominance and optimality are formally given 
in the following definition. 
a A∈ *a
 
Definition 6: An action profile  is said to be Pareto dominant over another action profile a if 
 for all i  and  for some 
aˆ
ˆ( ) ( )i iU a U a≥ ∈N ˆ( ) ( )i iU a U a> .i∈N   Moreover, an action profile  
is said to be Pareto efficient (optimal) if there is no other action profile a  such that 
 for all i  and  for some .
*a
*( ) ( )i iU a U a≥ ∈N *( ) ( )i iU a U a> i∈N  
Let us give an example that demonstrates the game theoretical concepts described the 
above. 
 
Example 1.1: Consider a static game where there are two users.  The cost functions of user 1 and 
user 2 are 
  2 21 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( , ) ( 2.5) ( 0.5)J x x x x x x x x= − + − − + +   (5) 
  2 22 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( , ) 3( 1.2) ( 2.2)J x x x x x x x x= − + − − + +   (6) 
respectively.  Let us consider the non-cooperative case in which each user wants to minimize its 
own cost function.  The level curves of  and  can be seen in 1J 2J Figure 1.4.  User 1 and user 2 
choose actions 1x R∈  and 2x R∈  respectively.  Notice that action sets of both users are the 
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same, i.e. . Let  be the action profile set of the game.  If user 1 had 
control on both actions 
1 2X X≡ ≡ R 21X X X= ×
1x  and 2x , it would choose the action profile (2.66, 1.33) that 
corresponds to the minimum of , denoted by  in 1J
*
1J Figure 1.4.  Similarly, if user 2 had control 
on both actions it would choose the action profile (1.43, 2.41) that corresponds to the minimum 
of , denoted by . 2J
*
2J
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4. The level curves of  and  1J 2J
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The best actions of user 1, , can be drawn by joining the points at which lines of 
constant 
1 2( )B x
2x  are tangent to the level curves of .  Similarly, the best actions of user 2, , 
can be drawn by joining the points at which lines of constant 
1J 2 1( )B x
1x  are tangent to the level curves of 
.  Although the best actions can be found by means of level curves, their analytical 
expressions can be easily found for this example.  We minimize  for given
2J
1J 2x  to find . 
Therefore,  will be only a function of 
1 2( )B x
1J 1x  when 2x  is fixed. The minimizer of  satisfies the 
first order necessary condition (FONC): 
1J
  *1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2
1
( ) 2( 2.5) 1 0 ( ) 0.5 2dJ x x x x B x x
dx
= − − + = ⇒ = = +   (7) 
Second order necessary condition (SONC), 
 
2
1 1
2
1
( ) 2 0d J x
dx
= >   (8) 
is also satisfied, thus, *1x  is the minimizer for given 2x .  In the same way, the best action set of 
user 2 can be found: 
  2 1 1( ) 0.5 1.7B x x= +   (9) 
Finding best action sets are complete.  Now, from the second definition of the Nash equilibrium, 
we have to find an action profile 1 2( , )x x  such that 
  1 2 1 1 2 2( , ) and ( , )x x B x x B∈ ∈   (10) 
The intersection point of  and  satisfies this condition.  Therefore, equate two best 
responses: 
1B 2B
 . 1 2 1 1 1 22 4 0.5 1.7 ( , ) (3.8,3.6)
N NB B x x x x= ⇒ − = + ⇒ =
In Figure 1.4 the point N corresponds to the Nash equilibrium of the game 1 2( ,
N N )x x . 
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Now let us find the Stackelberg equilibrium when user 1 is the leader and user 2 is the 
follower.  The leader knows the follower’s best action for its each action.  Therefore, the leader 
performs an optimization based on the follower’s best action.  We insert   into the leader’s 
cost function  and minimize  with respect to 
2 1( )B x
1 1 2 1( , ( ))J x B x 1 1 2 1( , ( ))J x B x 1x  to obtain the leader’s 
strategy: 
  (11) ( )221 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( , ( )) ( 2.5) (0.5 1.7) 0.5 (0.5 1.7) (0.5 1.7)J x B x x x x x x x= − + + − − + + + +
  1 1 11 1 1 2 2 1
1
1.5 4 0 2.66 ( ) 3.03S S SdJ x x and x B x
dx
= − = ⇒ = = =   (12) 
The point indicated by  corresponds to the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game, 
, when the first user is the leader.   Similarly, for the case in which user 2 
is the leader and user 1 is the follower, the Stackelberg equilibrium can be evaluated as 
, which is denoted by  in 
1S
1 1
1 2( , ) (2.66,3.03)
S Sx x =
2 2
1 2( , ) (2.5,1
S Sx x = ) 2S Figure 1.4. 
The curve joining the points of tangency between the level curves of  and  in *1J
*
2J Figure 
1.4 corresponds to the Pareto optimal points of the game.  In this case, the users cooperate to 
minimize a common cost function given as follows: 
  1 2 1 2( , ) (1 ) 0 1J x x J Jα α α= + − ≤ ≤   (13) 
It is clear that if both users minimize J, indirectly, one user chooses its action profile that 
minimizes its own cost function as well another’s cost function.  Let us find an analytical 
expression for Pareto optimal action profiles: 
 
2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
2 2
1 2 1 2 1
( 2.5) ( 0.5)
(1 ) 3( 1.2) ( 2.2)
J x x x x x x
2x x x x x
α
α
⎡ ⎤= − + − − + +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ − − + − − + +⎣ ⎦x
  (14) 
Write FONCs: 
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  1 1 2
1
( 4 2.2) 6 6.2 0J x x x
x
α∂ = − + + − − =∂   (15) 
  2 1
2
3.4 2 3.4 0J x x
x
α∂ = + − − =∂   (16) 
Simultaneous solution of equations (15) and (16)  results in: 
 
2
1 2
7.8 15.8 13.6 36.2 26.6and
11 8 11 8
P Px xα αα α
− + − += =− −
α
)
  (17) 
It is easy to check that 1 2( ,
P Px x  satisfies SONCs, therefore it is the minimizer of J.   Let us write 
the Pareto optimal action set *X  formally becomes: 
 
2
*
1 2 1 2
7.8 15.8 13.6 36.2 26.6( , ) : , , 0 1
11 8 11 8
X x x x xα α α αα α
⎧ ⎫− + − += = = ≤⎨ ⎬− −⎩ ⎭
≤   (18) 
Now consider the action profiles (1.65, 1.81), (1.43, 1.14), and (0.90, 0.47) indicated by R, 
S, and T in Figure 1.4, respectively.  The costs of user 1 and user 2 for these action profiles are 
given in Table 1.1. 
 
 
Table 1.1. Costs for user 1 and user 2 in Example 1.1 
when action profiles R, S, and T are used. 
 
 1J 2J
R 2.9 1.2
S 2.5 2.2
T 3.5 4.2
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The action profile S Pareto dominates the action profile T  because both users have smaller 
costs at profile S than at profile T.  Similarly R also Pareto dominates T.  A point in a Pareto 
optimal set doesn’t necessarily mean to dominate all other points.  For example, even *R X∈ , it 
does not dominate the profile S as the cost of user 1 is higher at profile R than profile S.  It is also 
easy to see that there is no other profile that Pareto dominates R.  Therefore, it is a point in Pareto 
optimal action profile set. 
1.3 A BRIEF SURVEY OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH  
Models of game theory have been extensively applied to a wide variety of problems arising 
from communication networks.  Problems of routing control [3,10,15,17,18,21-33], flow control 
[7-9, 11-13, 34-42] , capacity allocation [43-46], and pricing[47-49] the network resources have 
received considerable attention in the control and communication literature.  In a routing control 
problem, a user tries to find the path(s) through which it should send its throughput demand to 
have the best performance with respect to some performance criterion.  In a flow control 
problem, a user asks how much flow it should send to the network to find its optimum flow 
control strategy.  Differently, in the capacity allocation problems, users decide how much of the 
network resources they should allocate. Lastly, pricing of the network resources has been used to 
increase the use of network efficiency. 
The existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium constitutes one of the most 
important problems.  If there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, then we can analytically or 
numerically obtain this equilibrium point.  We may also try to tune the network parameters so 
that efficient use of the network resources is achieved at the Nash equilibrium. 
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There are few communication network models for which the uniqueness of the Nash 
equilibrium is established [50]. In [3], the authors provide a simple example to illustrate the 
difficulty of having a unique Nash equilibrium.  In the example, a network with only four nodes 
has two Nash equilibriums. Therefore, usually, the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is 
established case by case. 
Rosen’s diagonal strict concavity (DSC) conditions are used to establish the uniqueness of 
the Nash equilibrium in some studies.  These conditions guarantee the existence and uniqueness 
of the Nash equilibrium for convex games.  DSC conditions are shown to be satisfied for general 
topology networks with polynomial costs in [21].  Also, these conditions are satisfied by the 
parallel link networks with two users and two links and by general topology networks under light 
traffic conditions as in [3]. 
A user in a competitive routing network makes its decision of how to split its given 
throughput demand into the available paths.  Orda et al [3] study this problem for parallel link 
and general topology networks with L links and I users.  In this game, each user decides on the 
amount of flow for each link to minimize its own cost function without paying attention to other 
users’ performance.  In other words, by using the notation in the paper, user i minimizes its own 
cost by adjusting its flow configuration vector { }i 1 2f , ,.....,i i iLf f f=  where ilf  denotes the 
amount of flow user i puts on link l.   The outcome of the game is expressed by the system flow 
configuration that is the Nash equilibrium of the game given by .   The Nash 
equilibrium is investigated for a wide variety of cost functions that satisfy some mild convexity 
conditions.   The cost function of each user is expressed as the sum of all link costs.  The flow of 
a generic user through a link incurs some cost, called the link cost.  The existence of Nash 
equilibrium is established for both networks for this cost function.  The uniqueness of the Nash 
1 2 I(f ,f ,.....,f )F =
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equilibrium for the network of parallel links is established under the assumption that all users 
send their flows over the same set of links.  The uniqueness of the general topology networks 
demands even more restrictive conditions.   It is established by means of Rosen’s DSC 
conditions which hold for a lightly loaded general topology networks.  The Nash equilibrium is 
also stable and unique for a special case of the parallel link networks with two users and two 
links.   In addition to the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium analysis, intuitive 
properties of the Nash equilibrium called monotonicity properties are also explored.  For 
instance, the user with higher throughput demand uses a larger portion of each link than the user 
with lower throughput demand.  They show that the general topology networks might not have 
these properties.  
La and Anantharam consider the same competitive routing problem described above in a 
dynamic game context in [22].  The users are the Network Access Providers (NAPs) who 
compete with each other to support the best service to their individual network users.  They 
interact many times with each other until the state of the network changes considerably due to 
the change of the number of the network users, or the topology of the network, or the load over 
the network.  In practice, NAPs can communicate with each other before they make their 
decisions; so they can negotiate about the effective use of the network.  It is natural to consider 
that each user wants to increase its own performance.  Therefore, none of the users might desire 
to cooperate unless there is a reward for cooperation or might keep its agreement unless there is a 
punishment for deviating from it.  These interactions among the users cannot be analyzed by 
static games.   Dynamic games provide a better understanding of this situation.  In this setting, it 
is possible to have a Nash equilibrium that yield a minimum total system cost and every user of 
the network has a cost that is not larger than that of the static game setting.  That is the case for 
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parallel link networks and the Nash equilibrium which is socially optimal is called subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNEP).   SPNEP also exists for general topology networks if all 
users have the same source and destination nodes and if some light technical conditions hold for 
the network.   It might not exist in a general topology network with users having different source 
and destination nodes.  
Routing in communication networks and transportation networks have some similarities in 
nature.  In transportation networks, one driver has negligibly small effect on the other drivers and 
the solution concept is Wardrop equilibrium [50].  On the other hand, users’ flows in the 
communication networks are not negligible.  Altman et al [21] consider the routing control 
problem in general topology networks with polynomial costs.   Users have a fixed amount of 
flow demand to send to the destination and they have polynomial cost function that is borrowed 
from the road traffic context.  The cost function is defined by the US Bureau of Public Roads.  
The existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium are established for the general topology 
networks.  Moreover, it is shown that the Nash equilibrium does also result in a socially optimal 
network operating point at which the total cost of the network is minimum. 
It is well known that the Nash equilibrium is not usually efficient.  Therefore, different 
mechanisms are suggested to have an operating point which is more efficient then the Nash 
equilibrium [23,33,43].   Design parameters of the network and pricing the network resources are 
two examples of these mechanisms.  Korilis et al [33] consider the problem of architecting a 
non-cooperative network with I users competitively routing their flows through the network just 
like the users in [3].  In this study, the inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium is overcome by 
means of two techniques.  The first technique is employed in the provisioning phase, i.e., during 
the construction of the network.   The designer of the network adjusts the capacity of each link so 
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that the resultant network yields a Nash equilibrium which is system wide efficient.  System 
wide efficiency means that the overall network performance is optimum with respect to some 
performance criteria, in this case the criterion is the minimum network cost.  The designer is able 
to achieve this goal since it is assumed that users are rational and their performance criteria are 
known.  A mapping, called Nash mapping, assigns each capacity configuration of the network to 
a unique Nash equilibrium (system flow configuration).   The unique Nash mapping allows them 
to compare the Nash equilibriums to obtain the capacity configuration that yields the minimum 
total system cost.   To be able to compare different Nash equilibriums, it is also assumed that all 
users send flows over the same set of links for different link capacity settings.  For the network 
of parallel links, adding all available capacity to the link which has initially highest capacity is 
the user price optimal solution.  A capacity configuration is the user price optimal if it minimizes 
all users’ prices.   Price of a user, called marginal cost in economy, is the partial derivative of 
cost function with respect to the user’s own flow.  The second technique for overcoming the 
inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium is employed in the run time.  The network manager has 
control over some portion of the flow to route through the network.  The manager adjusts the 
amount of flow for each link just like other users to lead to a Nash equilibrium at which the 
minimum average network delay is achieved.   Thus, the manager plays a social role in this game 
to increase the efficiency of the system.  Since the manager actively adjusts the available 
capacity to other users by its flow; this technique is similar to the capacity assignment technique 
during the provisioning phase.  But, differently, the manager’s flow consumes some resources 
and incurs some cost to the network.  Authors show that the manager’s flow demand must 
exceed a threshold to achieve its goal.  Interestingly, the threshold decreases with increasing load 
in the network.  In other words, the manager’s job is easier for a heavily loaded network.  Lastly, 
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in this study, the authors also investigate Braess paradox.  That is, the addition of some more 
capacity to a network can degrade all users’ performances.  The authors prove that this paradox 
does not occur in parallel link networks.  One way to prevent this paradox from occurring in 
general topology networks is that the available capacity should be added to all links of the 
network uniformly. 
The routing control problems we described earlier involves routing of a given flow demand 
through the network.  The nature of the problem is completely different if the users are to send 
an unspecified amount of flow on the network and the problem becomes an optimal routing and 
flowing control problem.  In other words, users simultaneously decide on their flow and routing 
strategies.  Each user finds its optimum amount of flow for each link.   Altman et al [10] consider 
this problem for parallel link networks for an arbitrarily large number of users.  Users aim to 
maximize their utility function which is in the form of benefit/cost.  As mentioned before, this 
form of the utility functions is recognized as the power criterion.  A positive power of the total 
throughput of the user is considered to be the benefit term while the average expected delay 
experienced by the user’s flow is considered to be the cost term.  Maximizing this form of utility 
function can be interpreted as maximizing the throughput while minimizing the delay.  The 
power of the total throughput, adjusting the tradeoff between throughput and delay, can be user 
specific.  For this non-concave utility function the authors find an explicit expression of the 
solution for a single user that uses M parallel links.  Interestingly, it is possible to have an 
optimal flow configuration for the user such that some links are not used.  They also show that 
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium as the number of users becomes arbitrarily large.  The 
large number of users results into the Nash equilibrium which has delay-equalizing property that 
delay for each link becomes the same. 
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As mentioned before, pricing mechanism is also widely used to utilize the resources 
effectively and increase the system performance.  Korilis et al [47] consider a pricing mechanism 
that leads to minimum network congestion.  The authors suggest that price of a link is directly 
proportional to the congestion level of the link.  Therefore, highly congested links will have high 
prices that will produce an incentive for users to use the lightly congested links with low prices. 
The manager’s objective is to have the network operate at a target point at which the minimum 
network congestion cost is achieved.  A pricing vector of the network contains the prices for all 
links.  The manager chooses the pricing vector and all network users use this pricing vector to 
decide on their flow rates by minimizing their cost functions.  Flow rates of all users constitute 
the system flow configuration.  The authors prove that there exists a unique price vector that 
induces a unique Nash equilibrium at which the system flow configuration and the manager’s 
target system operating point matches up for parallel link networks.  For a general network case 
such as the Internet where users’ cost or utility functions are not known, they introduce an 
adaptive algorithm to find the price vector.  They obtain the sufficient conditions for the 
algorithm to converge to the optimum price vector.  
Rhee and Konstantopoulos [45] consider a bandwidth allocation problem for a parallel link 
network.  Each user reserves the amount of bandwidth that maximizes its own utility function. 
Utility functions are assumed to be concave and smooth.  In this model, users can have different 
utility functions and the users’ throughput is bounded between a maximum and a minimum 
value.  In previous works, each user had a fixed bandwidth demand or the users’ demands were 
limited by the capacity of the resources.  The existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium 
is established for parallel link networks and also for general topology networks with users 
establishing virtual paths along a fixed route.  That is, no user splits its flow over the links but 
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each user sends its flow along one virtual path in the fixed routing scheme.  Gauss-Seidel 
iterative method is shown to be converging to the unique Nash equilibrium for networks with 
one link and many users. 
Lastly, in study [52], an elastic traffic model is studied.  Traffic arising as a result of 
controlling flow rates with respect to available bandwidth within a network is referred as 
“elastic.”  In this model, each user chooses a price per unit time.  Based on this price, the 
network assigns a flow rate to this user by optimizing a network performance criterion.  For this 
network model, the authors establishes the stability of the algorithms which are based on 
additively increasing and multiplicatively decreasing flow rates.  They generalize these results to 
large scale broadband communication systems in [53].  
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2.0  FLOW AND ROUTING CONTROL FOR PARALLEL-LINK NETWORKS  
In this chapter, we consider a two-node parallel link network with multiple competing 
users.  This simple type of network is encountered in many of today’s communication networks in 
several different ways [43].  For instance, in a broadband network, users are assigned some pre-
allocated network resources and independent virtual paths are created by splitting the available 
bandwidth.  Each virtual path may be considered as a link in a parallel link network model.  
Similarly, to simplify routing in a complex communication network, users may be restricted to 
send their data flow on a specified number of paths between any two nodes in the network.  
Another example is that of an enterprise which is served by many ISPs.  The connections to the 
ISPs can be modeled as parallel links and the enterprise may have different preferences for each 
connection based on the price and its previous satisfaction with that ISP.    
Each user of the two-node parallel link network decides on its flow rate which maximizes a 
benefit-cost form of utility function.  Since our network consists of several parallel links, we 
provide each user with the flexibility of using different preference constants for different links in 
their utility functions.  That is, we allow the preference constants to be link-dependent.   In doing 
this, our model gives each user the option to choose the preference constants not only to balance 
between throughput and delay but also to reduce the usage of links that they perceive to be 
defective and increase the usage of links that they perceive to best meet their needs.  
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In section 2.1, we present a mathematical formulation of the problem and we derive 
conditions on the link capacities and preference constants which guarantee the existence and 
uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium for this network.  An analytic expression for the Nash control 
policy for each user is also derived.  In section 2.2, we discuss six properties of the solution 
which characterize its dependence on the various network parameters.  In particular, we show 
that, in general, allowing the preference constants to be link-dependent will lead to a control 
policy in which each user’s flow rate on each link is directly correlated with the user’s preference 
for that link.  We also show that the resulting Nash equilibrium will be non-symmetric and 
characterized by the fact that all users are not necessarily required to have the same flow rate on 
each link.  This can be especially useful as a mechanism for the network to offer different levels 
of quality of service to different users.  In section 2.3, we present two illustrative examples, and 
in section 2.4, we provide some concluding remarks. 
2.1 MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION AND DERIVATION OF THE NASH 
EQUILIBRIUM  
Consider a data communication network with two nodes - a source node and a destination 
node - connected by M parallel links and shared by N competitive users.  Let the set of links be 
denoted by {1,2,....., }M=M  and the set of users by {1,2,....., }N=N .  Let and mc miλ  for 
 and i  denote the capacity of link m and the flow (transmission) rate of user i  on 
link  respectively.  We note that the flow rate 
m∈M ∈N
m miλ  is a static control variable chosen by user i . 
The total flow of all users on link m is therefore given by 
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  m m
j
jλ λ
∈
= ∑
N
  (19) 
Let ( 1 2, ,.....,i i i M )iλ λ λ λ=  be an M-dimensional vector denoting the flow configuration of user i  
on the network links{1,2,..., }M .  This vector is chosen by user  from a control set: i
  { }: 0  for all Mi i mi mR c mλ λΩ = ∈ ≤ < ∈ M   (20) 
in such a way as to maximize a certain utility function.  Clearly, a solution 
* * * *
1 2{ , ,...., ,...., }i Nλ λ λ λ     is feasible if the non-negativity condition  0 for all ,mi i mλ ≥ ∈ ∈N M  
and the stability condition  for all m mc mλ < M∈  are both satisfied.  Since a change in any one 
user’s flow over the network affects all other users’ flow configurations, and since each user 
wants to maximize its own utility function, this network problem is best analyzed using a non-
cooperative game theoretic approach.  In this chapter, we are interested in the Nash solution 
concept [4-6] which represents an equilibrium condition when the network reaches steady state 
operation.   
We assume that the level of satisfaction of user i∈N  with a set of flow configurations 
implemented by all users is measured by a utility function of the form: 
  1 2( , ,....., ) mi mii N mi mi
m m m m
U
c
β λλ λ λ α λ λ∈ ∈= − −∑ ∑   M M   (21) 
As mentioned earlier, this function is in the form of “benefit – cost” where the benefit term 
corresponds to the ith user’s total weighted flow mi mi
m
α λ
∈
∑
M
, and the cost term corresponds to the 
ith user’s total weighted congestion cost ( )mi mi m m
m
cβ λ
∈
−λ∑
M
.  In this expression, the 
deterministic term ( )1 m mc λ−  represents the expected congestion delay on link m  for an M/M/1 
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delay function [3,22,33,43].  The parameters >0  and 0mi miα β >  in (21) represent preferences for 
the relative importance that user i  attaches to the benefit and cost terms on link m .   We note 
that although all users have utility functions that are of the same form, they can (and most likely 
will) in general use different pref ence constants in these functions.  Clearly, user i  wants to 
implement a flow configuration i
er
λ  which maximizes iU . However, iU  depends on the flow 
configurations implemented by all users. A Nash equilibrium solu r game 
problem is defined as a 
tion r this m
set of f
 fo ulti-use
easible flow configuration vectors * * * *1 2{ , ,...., ,...., }i Nλ λ λ λ     which 
satisfy the inequalities: 
 
* * * * * *
1 2 1 1, ,...., , , ,....,i i i i NU λ λ λ λ λ λ− +        (22) 
. cheating) from it.  In this sense, it 
rk problem.  For a solution in the interior of control 
t (20) for each user, these conditions9 are:  
i i Nλ
( )
( )* * * * *1 2 1 1        , ,...., , , ,....,    for  and for 1,2,....,  i i i i N i iU i Nλ λ λ λ λ λ λ− +≥ ∈Ω =      
As we mentioned before, an important property of the Nash solution is that when implemented, 
no user will be able to benefit by unilaterally deviating (i.e
represents an equilibrium condition for all network users.    
 We will now derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness 
of a Nash equilibrium solution for this netwo
se
  1 2( , ,....., ) 0    for all U iλ λ λ∇ = ∈    N   (23) 
nd  
i
a
  1 2( , ,....., ) is negativei i NUλ  definite for all λ λ λΗ     ∈N   (24) 
ondition (23) yields the following equations:    
                                                
C
 
9 The notations  and denote the gradient vector and Hessian matrix of  with respect to ( )
i i
Uλ∇  ( )i iUλΗ  iU iλ  
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( )2 0  for all ,m m mi
c i mλ λα β − +− = ∈ ∈N M   (25)   mi mi
m mc λ−
nd condition (24) yields a Hessian matrix which is diagon  and whose diagonal term is 
given by:  
 
 thma al
( ) 3, 2 ( )c( )i mi m m mii m m m mU cλ
β λ λ− +
λΗ = − −   (26) 
The equations in (25) have a unique Nash solution for the flow of user  on link  given by:  
 
i m
( ) ( )* *2*  for all mi m m mi m mc cλ λ γ λ= − − − ∈M m (27) 
where mi mi miγ α β= . We will refer to the term miγ  as the user’s tradeoff parameter for lin
To determine 
thi k m . 
*
mλ , insert (27) in (19) to obtain 
  ( ) ( )* * 2m m m m m mc N c *λ λ γ λ= − − −   (28) 
where m mi
i
γ= ∑ .  Equation (28) simplifies to the following quadratic expression in 
∈N
*
mλγ : 
 
* *2 2( ) ( 2 1) 0m m m m m m m mN c c Ncγ λ γ λ γ+ − − + − =   (29) 
The two roots of (29) are  
 
( ) )(* 21 1 4 m mN N cγ± − − ± +
2m m m
cλ γ
−= +   (30) 
The stability condition for the positive root 
*
m mcλ + <  reduces to 4 0m mcγ < , and this inequality 
can not be satisfied since both mγ  and  are positive constants.  Therefore, the root mc *mλ +  can not 
be a feasible solution.  On the other hand, the stability condition for the negative root 
*
m mcλ − <  
reduces to ( ) 21 ( 1) 4 m mN N γ− − < − + c  which is always satisfied. Therefore, the optimal total 
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**
m mλ λ −=link flow is , or 
 
( ) ( )2* 1 1 4
2m m mγ
ndition for non-nega otal link flow
m mN N cc
γλ − + − += −   (31) 
The co tivity of t
*
0mλ − ≥  can be reduced to m mN cγ ≤  for 
m∈M .  But the condition m mN cγ ≤ cally satisfied if all individual flo  
are non
 will be automati w rates
negative, i.e.  for all -  * 0miλ ≥ i∈N  and m∈M .  By using (27), the inequality 
ields 
* 0miλ ≥  
y
* 1 mi
m m m
mi mi
c c βλ γ α≤ − = −    (32) 
sing *mλU  as given by (31), condition (32) can be rewritten as:  
( )1 1   for all ,m  m
mi mi
N c i mγ γ − − ≤ ∈ ∈⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ N M
  (33) 
The sufficiency condition in 
γ⎛ ⎞
(26) is clearly satisfied since (32) implies *m mcλ <  which guarantees 
that the expressions in (26) will all be negative. As a final remark, we note that for the Nash 
solution to be an interior point of the control set (20), the inequalities in (33) must all be strictly 
satisfied for all users which will then insure that all flows on all links will be positive.  That is no 
link will be unused.    
An expression for the residual capacity in link  can be derived from (31) as:  
 
m
( ) ( )
*
21 1 4
   
2
m m m
m m
m
r c
N N
λ
γ
γ
= −
− + − +=
 c (34) 
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2.2 PROPERTIES OF THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
The Nash solution derived in the previous section has certain properties that are consistent 
with what one would intuitively expect the network to satisfy.  In this section we discuss six such 
properties.  The first and second properties are unique to our utility function with link-dependent 
tradeoff parameters and the remaining four refer to the special case of a network with link-
independent tradeoff parameters and are similar to the ones associated with the utility functions 
used in [3].  Throughout the discussion of these properties, the * superscript will be removed 
from the Nash solution to simplify the notation. 
 
Property 1:  For any link  and arbitrary users ,m∈M ,a b∈N , ma mbγ γ> ⇔ ma mbλ λ>  and 
ma mb ma mbγ γ λ λ= ⇔ = .  
Proof: Suppose ma mbγ γ> . Multiplying both sides by and subtracting  from both sides 
yields
2
mr mr
ma mbλ λ> . Now suppose ma mbλ λ> . Subtracting from both sides and dividing by  
yields 
mr
2
mr
ma mbγ γ> .  The case of equality can be proven similarly.  
Essentially this property says that the Nash solution allows a user with a higher tradeoff 
parameter to send a higher flow than a user with a smaller tradeoff parameter on any link of the 
network. As a result, users with high throughput demand (such as in video applications) may 
choose large values for miγ  while users with low throughput demand (such as in e-mail 
applications) may choose smaller values for miγ . 
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Property 2:  For any link , the total link flow m∈M mλ  increases monotonically with mγ . 
Proof:  If we rewrite equation (31) as:  
 
2
2
41 ( 1) ( 1)
2
m
m m
m m
cN Ncλ γ γ mγ
⎡ ⎤− −= − + +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  (35) 
it becomes clear that as mγ  increases, the second term on the right hand side (which corresponds 
to ) decreases and as a result mr mλ  increases. 
This property implies that an increase in the tradeoff parameters of all users for a link in the 
network will lead to a larger total flow on that link.  This, for instance, might occur when all 
users choose to increase the preference constants for the benefit term (the throughput term) at the 
expense of the cost term (the congestion delay term).   In doing so, the resulting Nash solution 
will allow each user to send more flow on the link, however at the expense that their flows will 
experience higher delays. 
 As mentioned earlier, the remaining four properties correspond to the special case where 
all users have the same tradeoff parameters on all links.  That is 1 2 ....i i Mi iγ γ γ γ= = = =  for all 
, which implies that for any link i∈N m∈M , m i
i
γ γ γ
∈
= = ∑
N
.   
 
Property 3:  For any pair of links ,m n∈M,  and m n mc c r r> ⇔ > n nm n mc c r r= ⇔ = . 
Proof:  It is clear from (34) that the residual capacity  of link m is monotonically increasing 
with , which implies that  yields .  Conversely, assume , using simple 
cancellation of terms on both sides of 
mr
mc mc c> n n n
n
mr r> mr r>
(34) yields .  The same proof follows for the case of 
equality. 
mc c>
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This property conveys the fact that the unused bandwidths of the links with larger 
capacities are greater than the unused bandwidths of links with smaller capacities. 
 
Property 4: For any  and i∈N ,m n∈M, m n mi nc c iλ λ> ⇒ >  and m n mic c niλ λ= ⇒ = . 
Proof: Assume , for .  Property 3 implies mc c> n ,m n∈M 1 1m i n ir rγ γ− > −  since 0iγ > .  Then 
 which yields that ( ) ( ) (1 1m m i m n i n n ir r r r r rγ γ− > − > − )1γ mi niλ λ> .  The same proof follows for 
the equality. 
Intuitively, this property implies users will be allowed larger flow rates on links that have 
larger capacities and equal flow rates on links that have equal capacities. 
 
Property 5: For any i∈N and ,m n∈M,  and m n mic c d d> ⇔ > ni nim n mic c d d= ⇔ = , where 
 is the residual capacity of link m seen by user i.  That is: mid
  ,
   
mi m mk
k k i
m mi
d c
r
λ
λ
∈ ≠
= −
= +
∑
N   (36) 
Proof:  Assume  which implies  by Property 3 and this implies mc c> n nmr r> 2 2m i n ir rγ γ>  which 
is equivalent to .  Conversely, assume . Insert mi nid d> mi nid d> miλ  given by (27) into (36) to 
obtain 2mi m id r γ= .  Then  impliesmi nid d> 2 2m i n ir rγ γ>  which, in turn, implies  since mr r> n
, , 0i m nr rγ > . The last inequality implies  by Property 3.  The same proof follows for the 
equality. 
mc c> n
This property says that an arbitrary user sees larger unused bandwidths on those links that 
have larger capacities.  
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 Property 6:  For , ,m n∈M m n mc c nλ λ> ⇒ >   and m n mc c nλ λ= ⇒ = . 
Proof: From Property 4,  implies mc c> n mi niλ λ>  for all i∈N . This implies that 
mi ni
i i
λ λ
∈ ∈
>∑ ∑
N N
 which is equivalent to m nλ λ> .  The same proof follows for the equality. 
This last property is a direct consequence of Property 4.  That is, if all users are required to 
have larger flow rates on links with larger capacities then the overall total flow rate will be larger 
on the links with larger capacities than on links with smaller capacities.  Similarly, in the limiting 
case where all links have the same capacities, the total flows in all links will be the same. 
2.3 ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES 
In this section, we present two examples to illustrate the solution concept and properties 
derived in the previous two sections.  For convenience, we will represent the tradeoff parameters 
of all users for all links in the network as an N M×  matrix ( ) 1,...,
1,...,
i
i Nm
m M
G γ =
=
=  whose (  entry 
corresponds to user  tradeoff parameter for link .  Similarly, we will write the Nash 
solution as an  flow matrix 
, )thi m
'si m
N M× ( ) 1,...,
1,...,
i
i Nm
m M
λ =
=
Λ =  whose (  entry corresponds to the flow 
rate of user i  on link .   
, )thi m
m
 
Example 2.1: Consider a simple network with two parallel links and two users.  Let the link 
capacities be and .  First, we consider the case in which the users’ tradeoff 
parameters are link-independent, i.e. 
1 10c = 2 5c =
1 2
i i iγ γ γ= =  for i=1,2.  For this case, the feasible region of 
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tradeoff parameters for the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium as described in (33) 
is shown in Figure 2.1.  As an illustration, the Nash equilibria for several arbitrary choices of 
tradeoff parameters in and out of this feasible region are given in Table 2.1 and also shown in 
Figure 2.1. 
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
γ1
γ2
Feasible
 Region
 
C
A
B
D
F
G
E
 
Figure 2.1. Region of feasibility for Example 1.1 
when users have the same tradeoff parameters for all links.  Feasible regions is defined by the set 
( ) 1 21 2 1, : 5 1 and , 1,2i
i i
iγ γγ γ γγ γ
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞+⎪ ⎪≥ − < ∞ =⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
. 
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 Notice that the tradeoff parameters of choices A, C, and E, which are outside the feasible 
region, produced Nash equilibria that are not feasible since at least one user has a negative flow 
on at least one link.  In choice D, both users have the same tradeoff parameters and as a result the 
corresponding Nash flow rates are the same on both links (symmetric Nash equilibrium).  
Choices B, F, and G illustrate different feasible choices of parameters yielding feasible Nash 
lutions.  Notice that in all cases, as expected; larger tradeoff parameters yield larger flows.   
 
ven dif
corresponding to seven different values  the pair
so
 
Table 2.1. Nash equilibria for se ferent cases 
 ( )1 2,γ γof  as shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
 1 2,γ γ  *Λ  Feasible 
A 0.1, 0.1 
0 1.54
0 1.54
−⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦  No 
B 0.5, 0.7 
2.22 0.62
4.44 1.87
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  Yes 
C 0.5, 2 
0.22 0.3
7.55 3.67
−⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  No 
D 1.5, 1.5 
4 1.76
4 1.76
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  Yes 
E 2, 0.55 
7.37 3.57
0.44 0.18
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦  No 
F 2, 2.5 
3.55 1.57
4.84 2.25
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  Yes 
G 2.5, 1.5 
5.6 2.65
2.68 1.09
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  Yes 
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 In order to illustrate the dependence of the Nash flows on the tradeoff parameters, Figure 
2.2 and Figure 2.3 are representative plots of  the econd ser’s Nash flow on link 2 and the total 
Nash flow on link 2, respectively, for varying 1
 s u
γ  and 2γ .  Notice that the flow rate is higher 
when 2γ  is larger than 1γ . This is in agreement with Property 1.  In Figure 2.3, note that total 
flow on link 2 increases as 1 2γ γ γ= +  increases, which is in agreement with Property 2.  
 
Table 2.2. Nash equilibria for five different choices 
of link-dependent tradeoff parame rs represented by the matrices G. 
 
Choice I Choice II Choice III Choice IV Choice V 
 
te
  
G 
11 1
1 2
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
1 1
1 6
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
1 1
1 1
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
2 1
1 1
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
2 1
1 2
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
9.08 0.68
0.04 2.84⎥−
⎡ ⎤⎢⎣ ⎦  ⎣ ⎦
3.75 0.07
3.75 4.15
−
⎥⎡ ⎤⎢
3.75 1.57
3.75 1.57
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
6.0 1.57
2.0 1.57
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
6.0 0.68
2.0 2.84
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  *Λ  
Not Feasible Not Feasible Feasible Feasible Feasible 
 
 
Now, let us allow the users to have different tradeoff parameters for different links.  That 
is, user 'si  tradeoff parameters 1 2and 
i iγ γ  are now represented as the thi row in the tradeoff 
configuration matrix G.  Nash equilibria for five arbitrary choices of tradeoff parameters 
represented by the G matrix are illustrated in Table 2.2. Choices I and II are not feasible because 
the feasibility condition (33) is not satisfied.  The tradeoff parameters in Choice I imply that user 
1’s desire to use link 1 is too high while those of Choice II imply that user 2’s preference for link 
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2 is too high.  Choice III corresponds to a situation where both users have equal preference for 
both links.  The resulting Nash solution is symmetric and both users have the same flow on both 
links.  Choices IV and V show that the user whose tradeoff parameter for a given link is higher is 
allowed a larger flow on that link.  Also, it is clear that the Nash flows on one link do not depend 
n the capacities of, or tradeoff parameters for, the other link. 
 
o
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Figure 2.3. Total flow on link 2 
 
 
Example 2.2: Consider a network with 3 users and 4 links, and let the network parameters be 
1 2 3 4
1 1 1 1
10, 8, 8, 6,  and 1 2 2 3
4 5 2 1
c c c c G
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= = = = = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
In this example, the four links can be considered as virtual paths connecting a source node to a 
destination node in a broadband network.  We assume that the users are capable of sending data 
on all available links whose maximum available capacities are as specified above.  Note that in 
this example, user 1 has equal preferences for all links, user 2 has highest preference for link 4, 
and user 3 has highest preference for link 2.  It can be easily shown that this case satisfies the 
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feasibility condition (16).  The Nash equilibrium flow rates can be determined and are given by 
the matrix 
 . *
0.6878  0.1504   0.7116  0.4119
0.6878  1.4336   2.9039  3.8627
7.1561  5.2832   2.9039  0.4119
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥Λ = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
Notice that the third user’s preferences for the first and second links are larger than the other 
users’.  Therefore, its flow rates on these links are also larger.  This user might be using a video 
application.  On the other hand, the first user, who is probably using an e-mail application and 
hence does not need a large flow rate, chooses smaller tradeoffs for all links, and as a result has 
smaller flow rates.  Also, it is obvious that users with the same tradeoff parameter for the same 
link should have the same flow rate on that link.  This occurs in the case of the flow rates of the 
first and second users on the first link.  Note also that even though some users have the same 
tradeoff parameters for two or more links, they usually don’t necessarily have the same flow 
rates on these links because of the difference in the link capacities and in the user preferences.  
For example, even though the first user’s tradeoffs are the same for all links, it has different flow 
rates on these links.  The Nash optimal total link flows are calculated as *1 8.5316λ = , 
*
2 6.8672λ = ,  *3 6.5194λ = , and *4 4.6864λ = .  It can be easily checked that all properties 1 
through 6 are satisfied. 
 Now consider a scenario where all three users linearly increase their preferences for each 
link, i.e.G Gσ= , where σ  is some positive constant. Figure 2.4 illustrates the Nash equilibrium 
total flow rates and residual capacities in the network links as a function of σ .  Notice that all 
total flows increase rapidly with σ  for small values of σ  such as ( ]0,1σ ∈ , and then level off as 
σ increases beyond a value of 2. This basically says that if all users decide to collectively  
 45 
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Figure 2.4. (a) Total flow and (b) residual capacity on each link 
as a function of σ  
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increase their preferences in an attempt to increase the total flow in the network while at the 
same time preserving a Nash equilibrium, then the network will quickly saturate and will only 
allow for incrementally small increases in the total flows and correspondingly small decreases in 
the link residual capacities. 
2.4 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, we considered two-node parallel link communication networks with 
competing users and derived a flow and routing control policy for each user which satisfies the 
Nash equilibrium condition of game theory.  The network is characterized by each user having a 
utility function which combines, in a linear additive fashion, two objectives representing the 
user’s desire to maximize its data throughput and minimize its expected delay.   Preference 
constants are introduced in the utility functions to reflect each user’s preferences not only with 
respect to the two objectives, as has been widely considered in the related literature, but also with 
respect to the links in the network. That is, each user is given the flexibility of choosing 
preference constants for the two objectives that are link-dependent.  A closed form expression 
for the Nash solution has been derived and feasibility conditions on the link capacities and 
preference constants which guarantee existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium have been 
established.  Several properties of the resulting flow and routing policy have also been discussed.  
These properties demonstrate that the Nash solution concept provides a viable equilibrium 
condition for parallel link networks with competitive users.  The resulting Nash flow and routing 
policies appear to be consistent with what would be intuitively expected as network behavior.   
The properties also demonstrate that the resulting flows are distributed over all links in the 
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network in accordance with the users’ preferences for these links, and that the flows will be 
higher on links with higher capacities.  Finally, we should mention that although this network 
structure is simple, the results obtained can be considered as a first step in understanding the 
characteristics and properties of the Nash equilibrium in more complex multi-user networks 
which are in general extremely difficult to analyze analytically.   
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3.0  FLOW CONTROL FOR GENERAL MULTI-NODE MULTI-LINK 
COMMUNICATION NETWORKS 
In this chapter, we consider a general network structure with many nodes and many links. 
We assume that each user has a pre-specified route on the network from a source node to a 
destination node and that its control variable is its data flow rate on this route. The model allows 
for each link between any two nodes to be shared by any number of users.  Each user chooses its 
flow rate by maximizing a utility function that measures its level of satisfaction with the choices 
of flows made by all users.   The utility function that we used in this chapter is the standard 
“power criterion” type that has been extensively used in the literature [7-12].  As mentioned in 
the Chapter 1, this function has the ability to combine the following two objectives: (i) 
maximizing the flow rate and (ii) minimizing the expected average delay experienced by the data 
flow. A user can adjust the importance of one objective with respect to the other by modifying a 
weight parameter in its own utility function.  Using this utility function, a single link network 
model was considered in [12] and the convergence of synchronous and asynchronous algorithms 
was established.  For a large number of users in a two-node parallel link network, an analytic 
expression for the asymptotic Nash equilibrium was derived in [10]. It was also shown that the 
Nash equilibrium flow rates tend to equalize the expected delay over the links.  In this chapter, 
we will generalize the above results by considering a general network structure with many nodes 
and links.  For the power criterion, we prove the existence and uniqueness of an interior Nash 
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equilibrium and we establish the convergence of the synchronous Gauss-Seidel algorithm to this 
equilibrium.  In this general network environment, we also derive some intuitive properties of the 
Nash equilibrium. 
In the next section, we formulate this general multi-user, multi-node, multi-link network 
optimization problem as a non-cooperative game between the users. In section 3.2, we prove the 
existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium, and in section 3.3, we give an illustrative 
example and explore some intuitive properties of the Nash equilibrium.  In section 3.4, we 
present some concluding remarks. 
3.1 MODEL FORMULATION 
We consider general network topology with M  links shared by  competitive users.  Let 
the set of links be denoted by 
N
{ }1, 2,......, M=M  and the set of users by { }1, 2,........, N=N .  Let 
 denote the capacity of link  and let mc m∈M iλ  denote the flow of user i .    The flow rate ∈N
iλ  which is the same on all links used by user i  is a control variable for user .  Let i miθ be a 
binary number defined as follows:    
  .  (37) 
1, if user  sends data over link m
0, otherwisemi
iθ ⎧= ⎨⎩
Using vector notation, we define the vectors c , λ , and iθ  as: 
 
1 11
22=  , = ,   and    
i
i
i
N MM
c
c
c
c
2
i
λ θ
λ θλ θ
λ θ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎡ ⎤ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎢ ⎥ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎢ ⎥ = ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎢ ⎥ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣
# ##  
⎦
  (38) 
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where Mc R∈ denotes the network capacity vector, 
NRλ ∈  the flow control vector, and 
M
i Rθ ∈ the routing vector for user  (we assume that at least one entry in i iθ  is nonzero) .  We 
now define the routing matrix Θ M NR ×∈ for all users as: 
 
11 12 1
21 22 2
1 2
Θ
N
N
M M MN
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
""
""
# # % #
""
.  (39) 
Note that this matrix has entries that are either zero or one and that its column is the vector thi iθ .  
As an illustrative example, the routing matrix 
  [ ]1 2 3
1 1 0
1 0 0
Θ
0 1 1
1 0 0
θ θ θ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
      
corresponds to the 3-user, 4-link, 4-node network shown in Figure 3.1 with user 1 sending data 
on links 1,2, and 4, user 2 sending data on links 1 and 3, and user 3 sending data on link 3.   
The residual (unused) capacity of link m  denoted by  is the difference between the total 
capacity of the link and the total flow rate over this link.  Therefore, the residual capacity vector, 
denoted by r , is given as follows:  
mr

  Θr c λ= −     (40) 
A flow vector λ is denoted as an interior point if  
  0    and     0rλ > >   (41) 
Finally, we assume that each user chooses its flow rate iλ to maximize a power criterion 
utility function of the form: 
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  ( )1 2, ,......., iii N mi
m m
U
D
αλλ λ λ θ
∈
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑M   (42) 
where  denotes the expected delay on link  andmD m  0iα >  is a preference parameter that user 
i  chooses to adjust the relative importance of flow rate over the average delay of its data 
transmission.  Clearly, the utility function of user i  is the sum of the individual utilities over the 
links that it sends its data on.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. A four-link three-user network 
 
 
A flow vector  constitutes a Nash equilibrium if its entries satisfy 
the following inequalities:   
* * * *
1 2= .......
T
Mλ λ λ λ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
  ( ) ( )* * * * * * * * * * *1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1, ,.., , , ,.., , ,.., , , ,..,i i i i N i i i iU U Nλ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ− + − +≥ (43) 
for 1,2,...,i = N  and for all possible values of iλ .   
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Assuming an M/M/1 queuing process for every link in the network, the expected delay 
becomes 1mD = mr .  Using this delay function and writing  (42) in vector notation yields 
  ( )    for all  i Ti i iU r iαλ λ θ= ∈  N .  (44) 
3.2 EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
The following theorem establishes the existence and uniqueness of an interior Nash 
equilibrium for the general network environment discussed in the previous section. 
 
Theorem:  For the general network structure described in (37) through (42) and utility functions 
(44), there exists a unique Nash equilibrium.  
Proof: A Nash equilibrium vector * * * *1 2= .......
T
Mλ λ λ λ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , if it exists, must satisfy the 
following necessary and sufficient conditions: 
 
2
20  and 0  for  1, 2,...,  
i i
i i
U U i Nλ λ
∂ ∂= < =∂ ∂   (45) 
When the necessary conditions are applied to (44) we get 
  1, 20   for ,...,T Ti i i i i i
i
i
U r Nα θ λθ θλ =
∂ = − =∂    .  (46) 
Inserting (40) in (46) and rearranging the resulting equation we obtain 
  Θ =    for 1,2,...,T T Tii i i i
i
c i Nλθ λ θ θ θα+ =      .  (47) 
Since 1 1 2 2Θ ..... N Nλ θ λ θ λ θ λ= + + +    , we can reduce (47) to the following:  
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1 T Ti
i i i i j j
ji
j i
cα Tiλ θ θ θ θ λ θα ∈≠
⎛ ⎞+ + =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ∑     N   (48) 
for 1,2,...i = N .  Equation (48) corresponds to a linear system of equations of the form A bλ =   
where the matrix A  and the vector b  are given by: 
 
1
1 1 1 2 1
1
1
2
2 1 2 2 2 2
2
1 2
1
1
and
1
T T T
N
T
T T T T
N
T
N
T T TN
N N N N
N
c
c
A b
c
α θ θ θ θ θ θα θαθ θ θ θ θ θ θα
θαθ θ θ θ θ θα
+⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎡ ⎤+⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢= =⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦+⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
…     
 …        ## # % #
 …     
⎥⎥ (49) 
Here, we note that the matrix A  can be written in the form A B C= +  where , which is 
a positive semidefinite matrix, and 
TΘ ΘB =
1 1 2 2
1 2
1 1 1diag , ,....,T T TN N
N
C θ θ θ θ θ θα α α
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠     
, which is a 
positive definite matrix, since all of its diagonal entries are positive. Hence, A  is positive 
definite which implies that it is also nonsingular, and the equation A bλ =   has a unique solution.   
Thus, A  is invertible and the unique solution is:   
  ( ) 1* T TΘ Θ+ C Θ cλ −=  .  (50) 
When the sufficiency conditions are applied to (44) we get:  
( ) ( ) ( )2 2 12 1 1  < 0 for  1, 2,...,  i iT T Ti i i i i i i i i i i i
i
U r iα αα λ α θ λθ θ λ α θ θλ
− −∂ = − − − + =∂      N   (51) 
The first term on the right hand side in (51) becomes zero by(46).  Since, for all i , ∈N iλ  and 
iα  are positive numbers and at least one miθ  is nonzero for some , we have m∈M
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22 0   for all 
i
i
U iλ
∂ <∂ N∈ .  Therefore, the flow rate vector given by (50)  is the unique Nash 
equilibrium of this network.  This completes the proof. 
We note that if the network consists of only one link then the linear systems A bλ =  given by 
(49) reduces to the special case in [12] where 1Ti jθ θ =   for 1,2,...i N= and the elements of vector 
are the same and equal to the capacity of the link. b
From equation (50), it is clear that the Nash flow rates are linear in link capacities.  In 
particular, if all link capacities are scaled by a real number  then the flow rates of all users will 
also be scaled by the same number.  Another important property of the Nash equilibrium is stated 
in the following proposition: 
 
Property 1: Consider two network optimization problems  and .  If all users have the same 
preference parameters and routing strategies in both  and  except that user i  has a 
larger preference parameter in X than in X hen this user’s flow rate will be larger in  'X  th  
in X . 
X 'X
X 'X ∈N
'   t an
i
,
To prove this property, let us use the notation ' to denote the network parameters of the 
problem .  Suppose'X 'iα α> .  For simplicity of notation, we will drop the * notation from the 
Nash equilibrium solution.  The Nash equilibriums λ  and 'λ  of the problems  and  satisfy 
the necessary conditions 
X 'X
A bλ =   and ' 'A bλ =   respectively.  Notice that the entries of matrices 
A  and 'A  are the same except for the diagonal entries which are thi ( )1ii i ia α α= +  and 
( )' ' 1ii i ia 'α α= +  respectively.  Since both iα  and 'iα  are positive numbers, 'i iα α>  
implies .  Let us define an 'ii iia a< N N×  matrix 'D A A= − .  Thus, all entries of D  are zero 
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except for the  diagonal entry 'thi ii ii iid a a= −  which is a positive number.  The necessary 
conditions A bλ =   of  can be written asX ( )' ' 'A D b Aλ λ+ = =   .    This is equivalent 
to ( ) ( ) 1' 'A Dλ λ λ−− =   .  The vector Dλ  has all zero entries except its  entry ( )thi ii iiD dλ λ= .  Let 
 denote the  column of ( .  Then the flow difference vector becomesiv thi )
1'A − ( )' ii i id vλ λ λ− =   .  
But the  entry of  is a positive number because thi iv 'A  is positive definite, therefore its inverse 
 is also positive definite and all diagonal entries of a positive definite matrix (( ) 1'A − ) 1'A −  are 
also positive.  Therefore, ( ) ( )' ii i ii id vλ λ λ− =    is a positive number indicating the amount of 
increase of flow rate of user i . 
 
Property 2: In a realistic network with a large number of users, the enforcement of the Nash 
flow rates obtained in (48) may not be straightforward.  Very likely, this may require a central 
entity in the network which has knowledge of the capacities of all links and the routing strategies 
and preference parameters of all users.  This entity would then determine the Nash flow rates of 
all users by performing the computations required in (50) and transmitting the optimal flow rates 
to the users.  This computation can be done in one step by computing the inverse ( ) 1TΘ Θ + C −  or 
by an iterative Gauss-Seidel process depending on the state of the network.  In the latter case, 
two possible algorithms known as synchronous and asynchronous algorithms can be 
implemented to converge to the Nash equilibrium.  Both algorithms start with an initial flow rate 
vector (0)jλ   chosen arbitrarily but satisfying (41).  In the synchronous algorithm, all users update 
their flow rates simultaneously at every iteration.  In the asynchronous algorithm, a randomly 
selected subset of the users (could be one or more) update their flow rates simultaneously at 
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every iteration.  In either of these two algorithms, at the nth iteration the users that update their 
flow rates (i.e. all in the synchronous algorithm, or a subset in the asynchronous algorithm), use 
expression (48) to perform the following update: 
    (52) ( ) ( )1  n T T ni i i i j j
j
j i
K c - λλ θ θ θ+
∈≠
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑   N
where  
  ( )1 ii Ti i iK
α
α θ θ= +  
  (53) 
 
We note that as a result of the positive definiteness of matrix ( ) 1− , convergence 
of the synchronous algorithm is guaranteed [51]
TΘ Θ + C
.  
n
As a final remark, we note that after some simple manipulations, the iteration given by 
(52) can be reduced to: 
    (54) ( ) ( ) ( )1
i
n n
i i l i i
l
K r Mλ λ+
∈
⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ M
where denotes the set of all links used by user and iM i iM  is the total number of links in .  
Note that ,
iM
iK iM , and 
( )n
iλ are all specific to user i .  Therefore, to update its flow rate, the only 
information user  needs to extract from the network is the sum of the residual capacities of the 
links which it uses.  This is an important result because the users do not need to know each 
other’s routing strategies or preference parameters to update their own flow rates.  However, it is 
important to mention that in both cases (synchronous or asynchronous) the rate of convergence 
of the algorithm depends on the preference parameters of all users. 
i
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3.3 ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 
In order to illustrate the results obtained in the previous section, consider the network with 5 
users, 10 nodes, and 16 links shown in Figure 3.2.   The routes for all 5 users are indicated on the 
network and assume that the preference parameters in their utilities are as follows 1 0.6α = , 
2 0.7α = , 3 0.8α = , 4 0.4α = , and 5 0.5α =  respectively. Recall that the higher the preference 
parameter the more emphasis the user places on maximizing its flow rate over minimizing the 
expected delay of its data.  Assume that all 16 links have the same capacity 
.  Throughout the example, when we allow one parameter to vary, 
we will usually keep all other network parameters unchanged.  Furthermore, we say that two 
users are “direct competitors” if they share at least one link on the network.  In other words, 
users and 
100 Mbps for 1,...,16kc k= =
i j  are direct competitors if 0Ti jθ θ ≠  .  For example, in Figure 3.2, users 1, 3, and 5 
are direct competitors because user 1 shares links 6 with user 3 and link 3 with user 5.  On the 
other hand, users 1 and 4 are not direct competitors.  
Using equation (50), the Nash equilibrium solution can be determined as follows: 
 
*
1
*
2
* *
3
*
4
*
5
30.5896
25.6984
31.8029
17.0026
23.4804
λ
λ
λ λ
λ
λ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
   (55) 
The total flow in each link can be determined by adding the flow rates of the users of that link.  
For example the total flow rate on link 4 which is used by users 2, 4 and 5 is 66/1814 Mbps and 
its residual capacity is 33.8186 Mbps.  As mentioned earlier, the Nash flow rates are linear in the 
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link capacities.  This means that if all link capacities are reduced from 100 Mbps to 50 Mbps, 
then the flow rates given in (55) will also be reduced by 50%. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Network topology for the illustrative example 
a 5-user data communication network. 
 
 
There are several interesting observations that can be drawn from this example by 
examining how varying some of the parameters will affect the network equilibrium.  We 
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summarize these in the following six observations. We note that although these observations are 
stated here based on this single example, they have also been observed in many other examples 
with different network topologies, different routing strategies, and different number of users. 
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Figure 3.3.  Flow rates of all users as a function of the preference parameter of user 1. 
 
 
 
Observation 1:  Let us assume that all network parameters are kept unchanged while the 
preference parameter of user 1 ( 1α ) becomes a variable.  Figure 3.3 shows the flow rates of all 
users as 1α  increases from 0.1 to 1 (i.e. as user 1 puts more and more emphasis on maximizing 
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its flow rate).  Clearly, we see that the flow rate of user 1 increases with increasing 1α . This is 
consistent with Property 1.  We also observe that the flow rates of the direct competitors of user 
1 (i.e. users 3 and 5) decrease as 1α  increases.  Note also that as the flow rates of users 3 and 5 
decrease their direct competitors, which are users 2 and 4, obtain larger flow rates.  Similar 
observations can be made if the preference parameters of any of the 5 users are varied while the 
other users parameters are kept constant.  These remarks are summarized more formally in the 
following observation:  If a user’s preference parameter increases, its flow rate will increase 
and the flow rates of all of its direct competitors will decrease.  
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Figure 3.4.  Flow rates of all users as a function of the capacity of link 7. 
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 Observation 2: A similar remark can also be made when the capacity of a link used by 
only one user is increased.  This has the same effect as increasing the preference parameter of 
this user.  Figure 3.4 shows plots of the flow rates of all users if the capacity of link 7 is 
increased from 30 to 100Mbps.  As can be seen from these plots, user 4, who is the only user of 
link 7, obtains a larger flow rate but the direct competitors of user 4, namely users 2, 3, and 5, 
obtain lower flow rates. This remark is summarized more formally in the following observation:  
If the capacity of a link used by only one user is increased, the flow rate of that user will increase 
and the flow rates of all its direct competitors will decrease. 
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Figure 3.5.  Flow rates of all users as a function of the capacity of link 8. 
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 Observation 3:  Another intuitive property of the Nash equilibrium is that an increase in 
the capacity of a link used by more than one user yields larger flow rates for all users of that link.  
Figure 3.5 shows plots of the flow rates of all users as the capacity of link 8 is increased from 90 
to 200 Mbps. Observe that the users of link 8, namely users 2 and 5, obtain larger flow rates as 
the capacity of link 8 increases. This is summarized in the following observation:  If the capacity 
of a link used by more than one user is increased, the flow rate of all the user of that link will 
increase.  
 
Observation 4:  We now examine the Nash equilibrium as a function of all users’ 
preference parameters.  To be able to do this and view the results graphically, let us assume that 
all users now have the same preference parameter for 1,...,5i iα α= =  and let us increase α  from 
0.1 to 1. This basically says that as α  increases, all users are placing more emphasis on flow 
rates rather than expected delays. Figure 3.6 shows plots of the flow rates for all users as a 
function of α  and Figure 3.7 shows plots of the residual capacities in some links (links 2, 6, 11 
and 12) in the network.  Observe that the flow rates of all 5 users increase, but that the rate of 
increase becomes less as α  approaches 1.  Similarly, the residual capacities decrease, but the 
rate of decrease becomes less as α  approaches 1.  These remarks are summarized in the 
following observation: If all users have the same preference parameter then an increase in this 
parameter will result in an increase in the flow rates of all users and a decrease in the residual 
capacities of all links.  In both cases, however, the rate of increase or decreases will be less for 
larger values of the parameter.  
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Figure 3.6. Flow rates for all users as the preference parameter of all users varies 
 
 
Observation 5: We now examine how the Nash equilibrium changes when a new user 
enters the network. Assume a 6th user with a preference parameter 6 0.6α =  enters the network 
and follows the same route as user 1.  The preference parameters of the initial 5 users are now 
back to their initial values: 1 0.6α = , 2 0.7α = , 3 0.8α = , 4 0.4α = , and 5 0.5α =  respectively. 
The Nash equilibrium for this new 6-user network can be determined as: 
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 *
1
*
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*
* 3
*
4
*
5
*
6
22.4786
26.0934
30.1992
17.3102
22.5358
22.4786
λ
λ
λλ λ
λ
λ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
   (56) 
 
 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Preference parameter α
R
es
id
ua
l c
ap
ac
iti
es
 (M
bp
s)
 
 
Link 2
Link 6
Link 11
Link 12
 
 
Figure 3.7. Residual capacities in some links as the preference parameter of all users varies 
 
 
When we compare these flow rates with those of original network with 5 users as given 
in (55), we see that, as expected, the direct competitors of the new user, namely users 1, 3, and 5 
obtain lower flow rates.  Now let us examine the effect of increasing the preference parameter of 
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the new user.  Figure 3.8 shows plots of all users’ flow rates as the preference parameter of the 
new user is increased from 0.5 to 0.9.  Observe that the flow rates of the new user’s direct 
competitors decrease monotonically as the new user’s preference parameter increases.  We 
summarize this in the following observation:  If a new user enters the network, then the flow 
rates of the direct competitors of the new user decrease as the preference parameter of the new 
user increases. 
 
Observation 6:       Finally, using the same original 5 users network, we will examine the 
rate of convergence of the synchronous and asynchronous algorithms to the Nash equilibrium. 
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Figure 3.8.  Flow rates of all users as the preference parameter of the new user varies 
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As mentioned earlier, in the synchronous algorithm all 5 users update their flow rates 
simultaneously at every iteration.  For the asynchronous algorithm, we allowed, few users to 
update their flow rates at each iteration, while the flow rates of the remaining users were kept 
unchanged.  We implemented this algorithm by randomly assigning to each user a real number 
from a uniform distribution over the interval [0, 1].  If the number assigned to a user is less than 
0.4, then this user updates its flow rate; otherwise its flow rate is kept unchanged. This algorithm 
resulted in two users on average updating their flow rates at every iteration.  Figure 3.9 and 
Figure 3.10 show the flow rates trajectories starting with an initial guess of  for 
all users, versus iteration number for both the synchronous and asynchronous algorithms 
respectively.  Notice that the synchronous algorithm converges faster to the Nash equilibrium 
than the asynchronous algorithm.  The slower rate of convergence of the asynchronous algorithm 
can also be easily seen in 
(0) 10 Mbpsiλ =
Figure 3.11, which shows plots of the Euclidean error norms 
5
( ) ( ) * 2
1
(n ni i
i
e )λ λ
=
= −∑ versus iteration number.  The slower rate of convergence of the 
asynchronous algorithm can be attributed to two factors: 1) If it so happens in the asynchronous 
algorithm that the same users are selected to update their flow rates for two or more consecutive 
iterations, then their flow rates will not change resulting in no change in the flow rates of all 
other users, which will slow down the convergence rate; and  2) Users in the asynchronous 
algorithm do not update their flow rates as regularly as those in the synchronous algorithm, 
which will also slow down  the convergence rate. These remarks are summarized in the 
following observation:  The asynchronous algorithm is slower than the synchronous algorithm in 
its convergence rate to the Nash equilibrium flow rates.  
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Figure 3.9. Flow rates trajectories for all users for the synchronous algorithm 
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Figure 3.10.  Flow rates trajectories for all users for the asynchronous algorithm. 
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Figure 3.11. Plots of the Euclidean error norms 
for the synchronous and asynchronous algorithms. 
 
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we investigated the flow control for a general multi-node multi-link 
communication network with multiple users competing for the same network resources.  We 
assumed that each user’s flow can enter and exit from any pair of nodes in the network, but that 
the route between these two nodes has already been determined.  We further assumed that the 
flow rates for each user are determined in such a way as to optimize a utility function of the 
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power criterion type that combines maximizing flow rate and minimizing expected delay.  
Although the possibility of cooperation among all users exist and may be feasible, in this chapter 
we considered only a situation where the users are competing and the possibility of cooperation 
and teaming does not exist.   For this general network, we derived an analytical expression for 
the flow rates that satisfy the Nash equilibrium condition from game theory and established its 
uniqueness.  This latter property is important because without it a mechanism will need to be 
added to the network management to guarantee that the Nash flow rates for all users are 
determined from the same equilibrium solution. Using an example, we illustrated the solution 
concept and derived some interesting observations that relate to the behavior of the Nash 
equilibrium in terms of various network parameters, including some convergence properties for 
the corresponding synchronous and asynchronous algorithms.  We should note that although our 
model is quite general in nature, it still has some limitations. First, our analysis is mostly 
applicable to wired networks where data transmission error rates are much smaller than wireless 
networks, and hence can be ignored.  Second, our approach is static in nature in that it assumes 
constant flow rates over fixed routes.  Although modern networks are dynamic in nature, this 
static analysis can be viewed as corresponding to periods of time when steady state equilibrium 
conditions have been reached in the network.  Third, we assumed that all users have the same 
type of utility function which indeed led to a unique Nash equilibrium.  Finally, we assumed that 
the data routes for all users have already been determined.  
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4.0  COOPERATIVE FLOW CONTROL FOR GENERAL COMMUNICATION 
NETWORKS 
In the previous chapter, we investigated general communication networks which consist of 
users, each competing with the others to maximize its own utility function.  However, a group 
(team) of users which are related to each other through achieving the same goal may concern 
more about team level performance than individual performance.  For instance, users of an 
organization using this organization's private communication network would like to cooperate to 
increase this network's performance instead of individual performances.   
In this chapter, we investigate the same general network structure in the previous chapter 
but within a more general framework.  We consider the network with only cooperative users 
which constitute a team and later we expand this model to multiple teams.  In the network with 
only one team, each user tries to maximize a team level utility function which is the sum of 
weighted utilities of all users in the network.  Each of these utility functions is in the form of 
power criterion given in the previous chapter [7-12].  This network has a leader which chooses 
the weight factors in the team level utility function so that the network users can achieve a larger 
utility value than their Nash equilibrium utility values.  For the next case, rather than having only 
one team in the network, we consider a more general framework in which there are multiple 
teams competing with each other.  Similar to single team case, members of each team cooperate 
to maximize their team's utility function which is again the sum of weighted utilities of all the 
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users in this team.  Similarly, the leader of each team decides on the weight factors in the team's 
utility function.  For this two level optimization problem with competing teams and cooperating 
team members, the Noninferior Nash equilibrium [17,18] becomes a solution concept which 
guarantees the best achievable utilities for each team.  We demonstrate this equilibrium with an 
example and compare its results with the standard Nash equilibrium. 
4.1 MODEL AND FORMULATION 
Even though most of the notation in this model is similar to the one given in the previous 
chapter, for convenience, we will give all notation used in this model.  We consider the same 
general network topology but with M  links shared by  competitive teams.  Let the set of links 
be denoted by 
T
{ }1, 2,......, M=M , the set of teams by { }1, 2,........,T=T , and the set of users in 
team(group)  by g { }1, 2,........,g gn=G  where gn  denotes the number of users in team .  
Therefore, the total number of users in the network, denoted by , becomes .  Let 
 denote the capacity of link  and 
g
totn
1
T
tot g
g
n
=
= ∑n
mc m∈M giλ  denote the flow of user i  in team .  The flow 
rate 
g
g
iλ  which is the same on all links used by user i  in team g  is a control variable for user i  
in team g .  Le
 
t gmiθ  be a binary number defined as follows:    
  .  (57) 
1, if user  in team sends data over link m
0, otherwise
g
mi
i gθ ⎧= ⎨⎩
Using vector notation, we define the vectors c ,
gλ ,λ , and 
g
iθ  as: 
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11 1
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22 2=  , = , ,  and    
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g g
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g g
g g i
i
g gT
nM Mi
c
c
c
c
λ θλ
λ θλλ λ θ
λ θλ
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
##   ##

  (58) 
where Mc R∈ denotes the network capacity vector, 
gng Rλ ∈  the flow control vector for team , g
λ  is system flow configuration vector (a 1totn ×  vector) which is constructed by placing 
individual team flow vectors one below another, and g Mi Rθ ∈  the routing vector for user i  in 
team  (we assume that at least one entry in g giθ  is nonzero) .  We now define the team routing 
matrix gΘ gM nR ×∈ for users in team  as: g
 
11 12 1
21 22 2g
1 2
Θ
g
g
g
g g g
n
g g g
n
g g g
M M Mn
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
""
""
# # % #
""
.  (59) 
The network routing matrix of Θ totM nR ×∈  is defined in the following:  
  1 2 TΘ Θ Θ ...... Θ⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦   (60) 
where team routing matrices are placed next to each other.  As an illustrative example, the 
routing matrix 
  1 1 21 2 1
1 1 0
1 0 0
Θ
0 1 1
1 0 0
θ θ θ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= =⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
      
corresponds to a 3-user, 4-link, 4-node network with user 1 in team 1 sending data on links 1,2, 
and 4, user 2 in team 1 sending data on links 1 and 3, and the only user of team 2 sending data on 
link 3.  
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The residual (unused) capacity of link  denoted by : k kr
  Θr c λ= −    (61) 
As we defined in the previous chapter, a flow vector λ is denoted as an interior point if  
  0    and     0rλ > >   (62) 
Finally, we assume that each user chooses its flow rate giλ  to maximize a power criterion utility 
function [7-12] of the form: 
  ( ) ( )
g
ig
ig g
i ki
k k
U
D
αλλ θ
∈
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑
M
  (63) 
where  denotes the expected delay on link k  and 0  is a preference parameter that user 
i  in tea  g  chooses to adjust the relative importance of flow rate over the average.  The 
n 
kD  
g
iα >
m
tationo ( )giU λ  in (63) implies that utility of user  in team g  is a function of all other users’ i
flow rates. 
Members of each team cooperatively decide on their flow rate to maximize the following team 
vel utility function: 
rg g g g g g gU =  
le
  1 1 2 2 ......        fo  all g gn nU U U gμ μ μ+ + + ∈T (64) 
where 
ˆ
g
iμ , 1,2,...., gi =
satisfy .  The leader of team  
n , denotes the weight factor for user i  in team g  and these weight factors 
 1
g
g
i
i
μ
∈
=∑
G
g∈T  chooses these weight vector of its members 
( )1 2, ,...., gg g g gnμ μ μ μ=  by performing the following optim
 
ization 
ˆmin max
g g
gU
μ λ
  (65) 
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for all possible values of gμ

 and gλ .  Even though maximizing ˆmaxg
gU
λ
⎛⎜⎝ ⎠
⎞⎟with respect to gμ  
would result in a larger total utility for the team, usually the resultant flow rates gives very large 
utilities for some team members and very small utilities for the other team members.   Therefore 
minimization of ˆmax
g
gU
λ
⎛⎜⎝ 
⎞⎟⎠  with respect to 
gμ

is more desirable by users because resultant u
levels of team members do not differ significantly. 
tility 
4.2 SIMULATION RESULTS 
In this section, we present two examples to investigate single and multi-team network flow 
rate optimization problems.  We use the same network topology in the previous chapter but with 
different number of users.  For both examples, all links of this network have the same capacity, 
i.e.  Mbps for . 100kc = 1,2,....,16k =
 
Example 4.1. In this example we consider the network given by Figure 4.1 where two users 
constitute a team by maximizing the following common utility function: 
  ( )1 21U U Uμ μ= + −   (66) 
where   and .   Since there is only one team in this 
example, we dropped the superscript referring to team number for simplicity.  Let user 1 and 2 
have the preference constants 
( ) ( )11 1 1 TU rαλ θ=  ( ) ( )22 2 2 TU αλ θ=  r
1 0.6α =  and 2 0.4α =  respectively.  Since the common utility 
function is the summation of weighted utilities of user 1 and 2 by the factors  μ  and ( )1 μ−  
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respectively, for largerμ  values, the maximization of U corresponds to the situation in which the 
maximization of the utility of user 1 becomes more significant than the maximization of the 
utility of user 2.   Similarly, for smaller μ  values the maximization of the utility of user 2 
becomes more significant.  By numerically maximizing equation (66) we plotted Figure 4.2, 
Figure 4.3, and Figure 4.4.  In Figure 4.2, as μ  gets larger, the utility of user 1 monotonically 
increases as we expect while the utility of user 2 monotonically decreases.  As can be seen from 
Figure 4.3, flow rates of these users change correspondingly to their utility levels, that is, as μ  
increases the flow rate of user 1 increases while that of user 2 decrease.   
 
 
Figure 4.1. A network with 16 links and 2 users. 
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We plotted the contours of utilities of user 1 and 2, their Nash flow rate, the Pareto optimal 
set (green line) in Figure 4.4.  For any given point in the strategy space of both users, the Pareto 
optimal set has the property of containing at least one point (a pair of flow rates belongs to user 1 
and 2) which gives better utilities to both users than this given point.  We also plotted the set of 
points as thick green line which have the property of yielding larger utility values than Nash 
utility values.  This can be considered as the payoff of collaboration.   Note that the Pareto 
optimal points connect the points at which the contours of U1 and U2 are tangent. 
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Figure 4.2. Utilities of the users when they are cooperative and non-cooperative 
 
 77 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
μ
Fl
ow
 R
at
e 
(M
bp
s)
 
 
User1 (Cooperative)
User2 (Cooperative)
User1 (Noncooperative)
User2 (Noncooperative)
 
 
Figure 4.3. Cooperative and non-cooperative flow rates of users in Example 4.1 
 
 
Example 4.2:  In this example, we consider two teams, team A and B, which decide on their 
flow rates based on the network conditions.  Users of each team cooperatively decide on their 
flow rate to achieve large utility values.  For the illustration purposes, let each team have two 
users.  The routing conditions for the network users are plotted in Figure 4.5.  Utility functions of 
team A users become  and , and team B users become 
 and .  Therefore, utility functions of team A and B can 
be written as 
( ) ( )11 1 1A TA A AU rαλ θ=  ( ) ( )22 2 2
A TA A AU
αλ θ=  r
r( ) ( )11 1 1B TB B BU rαλ θ=  ( ) ( )22 2 2
B TB B BU
αλ θ= 
1 1 2 2
ˆ A A A A AU Uμ μ= + U BU 1 and , respectively, where , 1 1 2 2ˆ B B B BU Uμ μ= + 1 10 ,A Bμ μ≤ ≤
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1 2 1
A Aμ μ+ = , and .  Let users’ preference parameters be , , 
, and .  In order to obtain their optimal flow rates for given 
1 2 1
B Bμ μ+ = 1 0.5Aα = 2 0.5Aα =
1 0.9
Bα = 2 0.4Bα = Aμ  and 
Bμ

, users 
of team A and B perform the following optimizations: 
  .  (67) ˆ ˆmax      and     max  
A B
A BU U
λ λ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ 
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Figure 4.4. The contours of the utility functions of user 1 (red) and 2 (blue) 
The Nash equilibrium is shown by a blue star with the letter N.  The Pareto optimal set is plotted as green solid line.  
The set of Pareto optimal points which yield larger utilities for both users than their Nash utilities are plotted as thick 
green segment.  The points on the thick green line are obtained when μ  is between 0.285 and 0.37. 
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respectively.  Due to nonlinear nature of utilities ˆ AU  and , we obtained numerical solutions 
of optimizations given in 
ˆ BU
(67).  We plotted the optimal flow rates of all users in Figure 4.6.  
Obviously, as 1
Aμ  increases 1Aλ  increases and 2Aλ  decreases.  We also noticed that for a fixed 1Aμ  
value, the flow rates 1
Aλ  and 2Aλ  do not change significantly even though 1Bμ  varies.  The similar 
trend is observable for 1
Bμ  and flow rates of the users in team B.  Next we plotted the utilities of 
team A and B in Figure 4.7.  The utility of team B monotonically increases  
 
 
Figure 4.5.  A network with 16 links and 4 users 
 whose routes are depicted as colored lines. 
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for .  This may be the result of the fact that user 1 in team B has much larger 
preference parameter than user 2 in team B.  Since users of A have the same preference 
parameter, we do not see the similar monotonic increase in the utility of team A. 
1 0.055
Bμ >
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Figure 4.6.  Flow rates of all users in Example 4.2. 
 (a) The flow rate of user 1 in team A, (b) The flow rate of user 2 in team A, (c) The flow rate of user 1 in team B, 
and (d) The flow rate of user 2 in team B. 
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Figure 4.7.  Utilities of the teams in Example 4.2. 
(a) the utility of team A and (b) the utility of team B. 
 
 
The leader of team A evaluates the optimal weight vector ( )1 2,A A Aμ μ μ=  which solves the 
following optimization problem: 
    (68) ˆmin max
A A
AU
μ λ
The leader of team B performs a similar optimization.  By means of numeric optimization, we 
evaluate the following unique Noninferior Nash equilibrium values: weight parameters:  
, , , and , users’ utilities: , 
, , , and teams’ utilities:  and .  
On the other hand, if all four users non-cooperatively decide on their flow rates, then their Nash 
equilibrium flow rates become , , , and , and 
their Nash utilities , , , and .  Obviously, both 
*
1 0.359
Aμ = *2 0.641Aμ = *1 0.055Bμ = *2 0.945Bμ = *1 1048.4AU =
*
2 1041.4
AU = *1 767.2BU = *2 1102.3BU = * 1043.9AU = * 1083.7BU =
*
1 25.63
Aλ = *2 20.48Aλ = *1 30.11Bλ = *2 21.32Bλ =
*
1 1038.2
AU = *2 741.9AU = *1 2151BU = *2 906.4BU =
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team A users obtain larger utilities when they cooperate than when they compete.  However, user 
1 in team B looses some utility while user 2 in the same team obtains larger utility.  This may be 
a result of preference parameter of user 1 being much larger than that of user 2 in team B. 
4.3 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we investigated the same general network structure with the previous 
chapter but assumed that all users of the network cooperate with each other when there is only 
one team in the network.  All network users try to maximize a network-level utility function 
which is the sum of their weighted utility functions.  The leader of the network decides on weight 
factors in this network-level utility function.  We showed that when all users cooperate, each 
user can obtain a utility value which is larger than its Nash utility value.  Next we extended this 
model to a more general framework in which there exists multiple teams which compete with 
each other while members of each team cooperate with each other to maximize their team-level 
utility function.  Again, the leader of each team decides on the weight factors of the team-level 
utility function so that the members of the team possibly get larger utility values than their 
corresponding Nash equilibrium.  We illustrated the results of these two level network 
optimization with two examples and compared the standard Nash equilibrium with the 
Noninferior Nash equilibrium. 
 83 
5.0  CONLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Efficient flow and routing control of network resources becomes crucial as the need for 
accommodating ever growing number of new network users.  In this thesis, we studied optimal 
flow and routing control problems using concepts from game theory.  These concepts are useful 
whenever there is cooperation or conflict among network users.  For several network 
configurations, we investigated the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium.  We also 
investigated the Pareto optimal and Noninferior Nash strategies for networks with one team 
whose members cooperate and for with many teams which compete with each other respectively. 
A two-node parallel link network provides a simple model to study the existence, 
uniqueness, and properties of a Nash equilibrium.  Each user of this network competitively 
decides on its flow and routing strategies by maximizing a utility function which additively 
combines the objectives of obtaining larger flow rate and smaller network delay.  Each user can 
choose the weight of the importance of one objective to the other by adjusting its preference 
parameters in its utility function.  This model also provides these users the flexibility of choosing 
different preference parameters for different network links so that users can adjust their 
preferences for each link based on their previous experiences from these links.  We established a 
necessary and sufficient condition which guarantees the existence and uniqueness of a Nash 
equilibrium for this network model and obtained an analytical expression for the Nash 
equilibrium.  We also showed several intuitive properties of this equilibrium based on user 
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preferences and other network parameters.  One important property is that a user with a larger 
tradeoff parameter obtains larger flow rate than other users with smaller tradeoff parameters.  
Another intuitive property states that the larger links carry larger flow rates than the smaller 
links. 
We extend our model to a general network environment where there is no constraint on 
the topology of the network such as links being parallel.  In this network, there may be multiple 
nodes which are connected by multiple links.  Multiple users may be sharing these links and each 
may have different source and destination nodes.  We investigate this network using the power 
criterion utility function which provides a more tractable flow control solution.  The routes of the 
users are fixed, that is, a user’s flow can only follow one path from its source to its destination 
node without being split into many paths.  In this model, we assume that user preference 
parameters are link-independent.  We prove the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium and 
investigate some interesting properties of this equilibrium heuristically.  An interesting Nash 
equilibrium property is that when a user increases its preference parameter, its flow rate 
increases while flow rates of its direct competitors decrease.  Another intuitive property states 
that if the capacity of a link is increased, then the flow rates of all users using this link also 
increase.  We also introduced synchronous and asynchronous numeric algorithms which become 
a distributive means of evaluating Nash flow rates.  That is, these numeric schemes do not 
require user-specific information from network, they only require the knowledge of residual 
capacities of the links in a network.  Since we heuristically observed properties of this Nash 
equilibrium, a future work may involve rigorous mathematical proof of these properties.  
Without fixing routes of network users, another challenging future research topic would be to 
investigate the simultaneous optimization of flow and routing controls for this model. 
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For the same general network structure, we investigated the case in which all users 
cooperative for the overall benefit of the network.  In this solution, users can use one of Pareto 
optimal strategies which give larger utilities to every user than they would obtain from their 
Nash equilibrium strategies.  Next, we expand this model by incorporating teams of users.  
Teams compete with each other while members (users) of each team cooperate to maximize a 
team-level utility function.  The corresponding solution is called non-inferior Nash equilibrium.  
We compare these results with the standard Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimal flow rates.  
One extension of this study would be to investigate the properties of non-inferior Nash 
equilibrium for this general network model and compare their results with the ones obtained in 
this thesis.  The investigation of numeric schemes for team members so that they could adjust 
their flow rate would be another interesting future research topic. 
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